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JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY:
METAMORPHOSIS IN ASIA

April Doreen Mohr

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California



THESIS

JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY:
METAMORPHOSIS IN ASIA

by

April Doreen Mohr

March 1976

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(20. ABSTRACT Continued)

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Japan's Foreign Policy:
Metamorphosis in Asia

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Japan's traditional post war policies are becoming increasingly more autonomous from those of the U.S., despite the fact that her defense policy remains linked to the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty. The alternatives open to Japan are diverse, each with a wide range of effects, but the validity of the U.S. commitment will be the chief determinant of the option selected. Nearly every element of Japan's post war policies has been dictated by the need to guarantee her economic viability. Her post-war defense posture, despite internal and external pressures, has been predicated upon a policy of absolute minimum defense. A major factor in Japan's move towards independence is her new relations with the Asian nations, specifically, the PRC and the USSR and the countries she considers to be primary threats to her security - Korea and Taiwan. Japan's future policy alternatives encompass a wide range of options, each dependent upon a given set of circumstances or events which could conceivably make any one policy choice inevitable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	8
II.	JAPAN INCORPORATED: POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH -----	11
	A. THE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY -----	15
	B. THE ENERGY CRISIS -----	19
	C. TRADE AND AID: SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST -----	28
III.	THE POLITICS OF NON-POWER -----	36
	A. THE THIRTY YEAR "PEACE": 1945-1975 -----	36
	B. THE NUCLEAR DEBATE -----	49
	C. JAPAN'S SECURITY OPTIONS -----	56
IV.	THE NEW ASIAN ENVIRONMENT -----	61
	A. THE SECURITY GAP: KOREA AND TAIWAN -----	62
	B. COOPERATIVE ENEMIES: JAPAN AND THE USSR -----	71
	C. COOPERATIVE ENEMIES: JAPAN AND THE PRC -----	77
	D. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT -----	80
V.	ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE -----	83
	A. THE ALTERNATIVES -----	83
	1. Continued Reliance Upon the U.S. -----	84
	2. Unarmed Neutrality -----	88
	3. Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons -----	90
	4. Bilateral Agreements -----	92
	5. Multilateral Agreements -----	93
	B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES -----	95
	1. The Economic Outlook -----	95
	2. Political Determinants -----	98

3. The Four Power Balance -----	101
4. The Military Outlook and Nuclear Proliferation -----	103
5. The Case of Taiwan and Korea -----	106
6. The U.S. Committment -----	108
VI. CONCLUSION -----	112
APPENDIX A: JAPAN'S POLITICAL PARTIES -----	115
APPENDIX B: TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN -----	119
APPENDIX C: TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -----	122
BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	128
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	138

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE I:	JAPAN'S PETROLEUM REQUIREMENTS (1960 - 1980) -----	21
TABLE II:	PROPOSED USSR - JAPAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS -----	24
TABLE III:	JAPAN'S TRADE WITH ASIA: 1974 -----	33
TABLE IV:	JAPAN'S IMPORTS FROM ASIAN REGION: 1974 --	34
TABLE V:	JAPAN'S EXPORTS TO ASIAN REGION: 1974 ----	35
TABLE VI:	COMPARATIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES -	40
TABLE VII:	JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES -----	41
TABLE VIII:	SUPPORT FOR EXPANSION OF THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES -----	42
TABLE IX:	JAPAN'S SECURITY POSTURE (1980's): CIRCUMSTANCES AND EVENTS -----	85
TABLE X:	BALANCE OF TRADE, 1980 PROJECTED -----	97
TABLE XI:	NUMBER OF ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES IN THE DIET BY PARTY (1955-1972) -----	99
TABLE XII:	RESULTS OF GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1955-1972) -----	100
TABLE XIII:	JAPANESE OPINION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS -----	106

I. INTRODUCTION

In the next two decades, certain political and security goals will continue to bind together Japan and the U.S. ... But autonomy and independent policy - which Americans profess to want for the Japanese - gain meaning and conviction as they are exercised away from, or against, U.S. policy ...

Herman Kahn
The Emerging Japanese
Superstate

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a relationship between the United States and Japan somewhat unique in the history of international politics. For the past thirty years, nearly the whole of Japan's foreign policy has consisted of echoing the political, economic and international policies of Washington. Recent years, however, have produced events indicative of substantial change in Japan's traditional alliance with the United States. Vietnam, detente, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the "Nixon shocks", and the oil crises have caused Japan to re-evaluate both her dependency upon the United States and her own potential as a world leader.

These changes are diverse and complex and reflect a trend toward a new foreign policy for Japan, marked by a greater integration into the Asian community and a definitive move towards greater autonomy from the United States.

Since, from the viewpoint of the United States, Japan has traditionally been considered essential to the defense of American interests in East Asia, the problem, as

originally hypothesized, was that a substantial shift in Japanese foreign and defense policy would have the potential of altering the extent and the nature of U.S. defense commitments in the Far East. However, since completion of the research, the author was forced to arrive at a conclusion completely the opposite of the original hypothesis, namely that Japanese foreign and defense policies in the 1980's will not affect the U.S. commitment, but will be directly affected by the continued viability of that commitment.

The sources utilized were generally confined to those appearing over the course of the last five years and consisted of books, monographs, technical reports, scholarly journals, government sponsored research projects, translations of the Japanese press and personal interviews.

A plethora of information was obtained generally falling into two basic schools of thought. One, as epitomized by former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, is of the firm conviction that Japan is drifting away from her post-war paternal-filial relationship with the United States. However, they also believe that she cannot, at least for the near future, continue as a viable power without the maintenance of U.S. military and economic guarantees. The second school is most aptly represented by Albert Axelbank, and believes that the pre-war hyperbolic nationalism of Japan will manifest itself again. This school exhibits the belief that Japan has both the capability and the national will to

"make it on her own" and become a military global power as well as an economic one.

The content of this thesis is divided into four major chapters. The following chapter is an examination of the role of economics and trade as the traditional focal point of post-war Japanese foreign and domestic policies. Also explored is Japan's absolute reliance upon open access to sources of energy and resource supplies. In addition, her new interest in the potential of the lesser developed nations of Asia and the Middle East is discussed. Chapter III examines the military role in Japan's policy making including an analysis of prospective alternatives to the strict maintenance of the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Chapter IV is a study of Japan's emerging interest in her relations with other Asian powers, specifically, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Also included is the Communist powers' relationships to the areas considered by Japan to be security problems - Korea and Taiwan. The last chapter explores the Japan of the 1980's and the plausibility of certain available policy alternatives. These are analyzed within a general set of international/domestic circumstances which would make a given alternative an inevitable course of action.

II. JAPAN INCORPORATED: POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

For the building of a new Japan
Let's put our strength and mind together,
Doing our best to promote production
Sending our goods to the people of the world
Endlessly and continuously,
Like water gushing from a fountain
Grow industry, grow, grow, grow! ...

Worker's Song
Matsushita Electric Co.

"Which of the four power blocs in the world will Japan end up joining?" asked the American oil tycoon of the Japanese banker.

"There will be four and a half blocs," was the answer."¹

Perhaps this anecdote is indicative of Japan's perceptions about herself and her role -- not quite a world power, but solvent and secure in a position of economic superpower, secure enough to think in terms of a "half bloc", an economic bloc of which she would be the undisputed leader. Following the end of World War II, both the Ikeda and Kishi administrations embarked on a serious effort to develop Japan's economic potential. American military protection and new foreign markets opened the door to a chain of events destined to produce the most rapid economic growth ever witnessed on the international scene. From the post-war period

¹Gibney, Frank, Japan: The Fragile Superpower, p. 309, W.W. Norton and Co., 1975.

into the 1970's, the Japanese have been working toward industrial, economic and technological development under nearly ideal conditions: industrious people, American aid and a wealth of entrepreneurial talent. The "most crucial element of this paradise has been the external situation: an undervalued currency, exports growing 2.5 times as rapidly as world trade, and technology and resource imports readily available under favorable conditions."² Another contributing factor is the fact that Japan's minimal defense policies required expenditures of less than one per cent of the GNP. "The rather negative security policies based on a minimum defense, far from weakening Japan, may actually have strengthened it for the new era in which economic power was to count for much more than ever before."³ But time and the vagaries of international politics have altered Japan's economic paradise. The technology gap has been effectively closed. Labor costs are steadily increasing with public demands for higher wages and better living conditions. The inflationary trend shows no immediate signs of letting up and, perhaps most important, world opinion has changed. Foreign countries are rapidly growing less and less amenable

²Clapp, Patricia and Halperin, Morton, United States - Japanese Relations: the 1970's, p. 83, The Harvard University Press, 1974.

³Langdon, F.C., Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 54, University of British Columbia Press, 1973.

to accepting and aiding Japan's hitherto unchecked economic domination.

Following the end of World War II, Japan embarked on her unparalleled economic progression by living by and with the philosophy of "export or perish". Her goal was to produce cheaply, rapidly and in quantity, taking her manufactured products almost completely out of the traditionally competitive system of world trade; for years, no other nation could compete effectively. The words "made in Japan" appeared on everything from electronic equipment to Christmas decorations and "authentic" American Indian crafts. She developed what is unflatteringly known as the "Japan Incorporated" syndrome, a disease closely akin to that afflicting monolithic corporations, egocentric and self-serving in all her economic dealings with both Asia and the West. "Japan's concept of foreign trade has been as of a process whereby her industry has been fuelled and supplied, rather than one which is intrinsically desirable for the international exchange of goods."⁴ Today, world interests are attempting to fight back. Developing nations, seeking to advance their own economies, are demanding that Japan open her doors to more imports. The advanced nations of Europe and North America have felt the pinch of Japan's heavy influx of

⁴Ellingworth, Richard, Adelphi Paper #90, "Japanese Economic Policies and Security," p. 11, International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 1972.

textiles and automobiles and are imposing newer, more vocal restrictions. Perhaps this economic animosity will provide the impetus for a change in Japan's "trade of die" role, force her to become a responsible power at the expense of a continued ten per cent per annum growth rate or face the possibilities of being relegated to the position of "odd man out" in the realm of international economic relations.

However, this change in world attitude is only a minute part of Japan's economic dilemma. She is highly vulnerable to world conflicts and changes in friend-enemy relationships because of her near total reliance upon the import of raw materials. In conjunction with her absolute need for all forms of natural resources, is the necessity for maintaining security of the sea lanes, straits and transit points through which this lifeblood flows. In these days of prima donna third world nations who enjoy capriciously exercising their new-found powers, Japan's fears of having the sea lanes severed are real ones.

The implications of Japan's economic dilemma have the potential to be far reaching and serious and may prove to be a catalyst in changing the overall pattern of Japanese foreign policy; her relations with present allies and former enemies. For thirty years Japan has worked hard and diligently to produce the third greatest industrial economy in the world. Today's economic problems may mark the success or the failure of her continued prosperity.

A. THE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

In this era of power politics and detente, although Japan appears to believe that she has no crucial military worries, she admittedly has developed some severe economic ones. The issues of economic security and national security have become so closely intertwined, they are inseparable. In the early years after World War II, any attempt by Japan to conduct an independent foreign policy was stifled by Western (chiefly U.S.) domination and a world-wide fear of recurring Japanese militarism. As a result, Japan's total foreign policy effort became definitively economic oriented, a policy based upon the need for survival through exports, rapid industrial growth and a search for large, secure overseas markets as an outlet for her new production capabilities. Imports were to be limited to those raw materials and products Japan did not as yet have the technological ability to produce or the natural resources to exploit domestically. Her economy grew at a staggering rate and, by 1960, Japan was recording an annual growth rate in excess of ten per cent.⁵ But American Japan-watchers have predicted that Japan's days of unbridled growth rates are over, that the oil crises, the "Nixon shocks" and the trend toward greater market protection on the part of other countries, will have an increasingly debilitating effect upon Japan's continued economic

⁵Gibney, op. cit., p. 178.

growth. Although Japanese economists appear to be more optimistic, it does not seem feasible that Japan can any longer reach the growth rate levels of the 1960's.⁶ A great deal of the blame lies with the world-wide recession which hard hit the industrial nations and which may be the cause of predicting that Japan's 17 per cent volume growth in exports will shrink significantly in 1975.⁷

Japan's assurance about the stability of her role as an economic power was probably initially and most severely shaken by the 1971 so-called second Nixon shock. In August of 1971, President Nixon announced a sweeping new economic policy promulgated as a cure for the American trade deficit. Although superficially applicable to all U.S. trading partners, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that the program was aimed directly at Tokyo's giant trading companies.⁸ The measures were sweeping and included a devaluation of the dollar and quota restraints on imports to the United States. The move not only took Japan by surprise, but under American

⁶The Japan Economic Research Center estimates an average rate of growth of 17.2% in the 1970-1980 time frame vice the 15.9% recorded in the period 1960-1970. This figure would raise Japan's share of the world GNP from 6.4% to 12.5% and her share of world exports from 6.2% to 10%. (Ellingworth, op. cit., p. 12-13.)

⁷Ellingworth, op. cit., p. 13.

⁸Roskovsky, Henry, "Japan and the United States: Note From the Devil's Advocate", United States - Japanese Relations, The 1970's, p. 79, edited by Patricia Clapp and Morton Halperin, Harvard University Press, 1974.

pressure, led her into certain additional "voluntary" moves. Under Prime Minister Sato's Eight Point Program, Japan undertook moves of her own to ease the economic tension with the United States, including: a revaluation of the yen (which had stood at 360 yen per dollar since 1949), a progressive cut in the number of categories of imports upon which the Japanese could impose quota restrictions, a liberalization of the restraints imposed on American investors, the expansion of Japanese foreign aid programs to Asia, cuts in import and commodity taxes placed on American autos sold in Japan and "voluntary" restraints on exports.

Nixon Shock Two was far more traumatic for Japan than Nixon Shock One, the U.S. President's surprise visit to Peking. Although the China shock was severe, it had "struck at emotions" while the "Japanese would consider the 'economic shock' as affecting very deeply their livelihood."⁹ Perhaps more importantly, the shock confused her, shaking somewhat her faith in her legendary American ally.

Japan reacted with dismay, wonderment and the inability to understand why she was being punished for something that had always been accepted in the past. The reaction of Japan to her damaged pride and economic losses must prompt the resolve to never again let herself be placed in a position where another country could unilaterally inflict similar chaos to her economy.¹⁰

⁹ Meyer, Armin, Assignment: Tokyo, An Ambassador's Journal, p. 171, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974.

¹⁰ Air University Report No. AU-1370-74, Japan -- Her Dilemma in Alliance and Allegiance, by C.F. Jewett, p. 7-8, 1974.

Even this wasn't the end of foreign reaction. The friction with the United States over import quotas spilled over into the European Economic Community which imposed its own quotas in anticipation of an increase in Japanese imports to Europe in an effort to offset the American loss. South Korea and Taiwan, with their own rapidly growing textile industries, slammed the door on further imports of textiles from their Asian neighbors. More recently, with American domestic auto sales at record lows, a potential U.S. consideration to restrict auto imports could prove to be a fatal blow to the Japanese auto industry which relies upon the United States for the largest percentage of its exports.

All of this does not merely represent an inconvenience for Japan, a temporary blow to her efforts to improve her people's standard of living, but a sharp and stinging blow to her economic viability -- her very survival. It is not out of the realm of possibility that her future foreign policies may be forced upon Japan on the basis of protection of these interests and against perceptible threats aimed at them. Certainly it means an active endeavor to broaden her markets, increase the number of her trading partners, and to embark on quid pro quo programs with likely, but underdeveloped prospects. Most of all, it could conceivably mean forced neutrality, a gradual trend away from the Western camp to broader, more viable alternatives.

B. THE ENERGY DILEMMA

Japan's biggest obstacle to continued growth is her near total lack of natural resources and her rapidly increasing usage of energy. By 1973 "oil was supplying more than 80 per cent of Japan's energy" and then Prime Minister Tanaka warned that the country's consumption was scheduled to "triple in five or six years".¹¹ Japan exists by energy imports and "its industry and trade patterns are so finely balanced that the slightest jar will cause shakings and tremors throughout the economy".¹² With that kind of heavy reliance upon oil import, the recent Arab oil embargoes took their toll. A continued shortage can slow down industrial production drastically, which will directly cause an increase in inflation leading in turn to increased consumer demands. High prices are already a fact of life in Japan. For example, the cost of land has quadrupled in the past ten years, food stuffs increase monthly and there has been a significant depreciation in the value of private savings over the past year. Overall consumer prices increased 4.5 per cent in 1972 compared with 15 per cent in 1973.¹³ One could put the blame on recession, inflation or any other

¹¹Gibney, op. cit., p. 285.

¹²Ibid., p. 285-286.

¹³Yomiuri Shimbun, April 1974.

economic euphemism, but the fact remains that it is Japan's critical need for energy resources that is the source of the problem.

Natural gas used to be produced domestically. Today, the demand for it is increasing far in excess of Japan's ability for home production. Japan's indigenous coal reserves are steadily declining and what is left is of poor quality (that is, unsuitable for steel). Her total coal output has decreased from 55+ million tons in 1961 to 40 million tons in 1967 to less than 20 million tons in 1972.¹⁴ Petroleum imports comprise 75 per cent of Japan's total energy consumption vice 25 per cent less than ten years ago,¹⁵ with an import total in 1974 of 280 million tons of crude oil and a projected need of 750 million tons per year by 1980.¹⁶ If these figures sound nearly unreasonable, the following chart emphasizes Japan's continuing need for oil. Although the percentages are decreasing, the chart still reflects an average growth of nearly ten per cent per year.

¹⁴Nihon Keizai, "How to Reconstruct the Pillars of Coal Policy", 21 March 1975.

¹⁵Osgood, Robert E., The Weary and the Wary, p. 29, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.

¹⁶Minix, Thomas, Japan: Alternatives for the Future, p. 7, Army War College, February 1973.

TABLE I
JAPAN'S PETROLEUM REQUIREMENTS (1960 - 1980)¹⁷

	<u>% of Growth in Oil Consumption</u>	<u>% of Growth in Oil Imports</u>
1960 - 1965	22.4	22.4
1965 - 1970	17.5	17.5
1970 - 1980	9.4	9.4

In addition, by the early 1970's Japan was relying upon imports for 99 per cent of her iron ore, 50 per cent of her wood, 80 per cent of her copper, 100 per cent of her bauxite¹⁸ and 100 per cent of her aluminum, nickel and uranium.¹⁹ Recent attempts to engage in ninety day stockpiling of energy resources have only been partially successful in keeping ahead of her needs. To compound her difficulties, traditional "assured sources of supply" have been failing, chiefly due to the supplier's own increasing domestic demands.

Japan's solutions to her critical need for energy are few. She can:

¹⁷Ellingworth, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁸Area Handbook for Japan, p. 381, Department of the Army, 1974.

¹⁹Miller, Michael, The United States and Japan: A New Geometry in Asia, p. 15, University of Washington, 1974.

- 1) embark on increased efforts for alternative energy sources (e.g. solar or nuclear energy),
- 2) expand and diversify energy suppliers to avoid dependence upon a single source,
- 3) improve methods and means of transporting resources to the homeland (i.e. the greatest quantities via the shortest route).

Very little can be said about Japan's search for substitute energy sources. Solar energy is still in the distant future for Japan and, although "the Atomic Energy Institute estimated that sixty million kilowatt hours of nuclear power would be available by 1985 ... this would still leave Japan more than 70 per cent dependent on oil."²⁰

Therefore, Japan is expending most of her time and talent searching for new and expanded energy supplies. Currently, more than 85 per cent of Japan's oil comes from the Persian Gulf countries with only small amounts from other nations (chiefly Indonesia).²¹ It is obvious why Japan should be looking for new suppliers, uneasy as she is about relying so much upon an area as politically volatile as the Middle East.

Only Australia and Indonesia rank as substantial suppliers in the Asian community. Australia provides more than 30 per cent of Japan's iron ore, 50 per cent of her bauxite and 50

²⁰Gibney, op. cit., p. 285.

²¹Ellingworth, op. cit., p. 14.

per cent of her lead and zinc needs.²² Indonesia supplies a respectable proportion of Japan's oil and a sizeable percentage of her own oil and oil product total exports (60 per cent of Indonesia's crude oil and 80 per cent of her petroleum products).²³

However, Japan's newest trend and the move with potentially the most important implications (both economically and politically) is her new relations with her Communist neighbors, chiefly, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Although the Nixon shocks might have been the catalyst in Japan's seeking new ties with Moscow and Peking, it is more likely merely the critical need for additional resource outlets.

Among the proposals and negotiations currently underway with the Soviet Union are agreements for the exploitation of oil, copper, coal, lumber and natural gas in Western Siberia and on Sakhalin Island.

The proposed Japan - USSR Tyumen oil development project could conceivably net the Japanese 25-40 million tons of crude oil per year via the second Trans-Siberian Railroad.²⁴

²²Ellingworth, op. cit., p. 14.

²³Ibid.

²⁴The original proposal for a jointly funded pipeline fell through in late 1973. Perhaps the Soviets recognized the strategic advantage of having a new railroad system in Western Siberia.

Although currently only a proposal, sources indicate that the Japanese may offer the Soviets a sizeable amount of money for completion of the project, but both sides are still hesitating at the proposition of hinging so much upon the "good offices" of a traditional enemy. But the attempts at resource cooperation have not stopped with Tyumen. The table below exhibits the extent of potential Japanese involvement in Siberian development projects.

TABLE II
PROPOSED JAPAN - USSR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS²⁵

<u>Project</u>	<u>Required Total Investment (Japan & USSR) in \$ x Billion</u>
Udokan Copper	1.2
Sakhalin Natural Gas	0.9
Komatsu Lumber	0.2
Kamchatka Sulfur	0.1
Yakutia Coal and Gas	0.3
TOTAL	<u>2.7</u>

These efforts, none more than first overtures, have been seen by some as an attempt to keep Japan dependent upon the USSR rather than going elsewhere for new resources. In

²⁵ Research Analysis Corporation, Report # RAC-R-93, Strategic Implications of Soviet-Japanese Trade, by Carl Modig, p. 22, April 1970.

addition, solid economic relations with the Soviet Union have the potential to seriously damage future rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (especially if Japan assisted in building a new railroad across Siberia to Soviet naval ports, a distinct strategic advantage which could only be viewed by the Chinese as a threat to their own security). Thus, Japan has lost some interest in the Tyumen development and has opened the doors to China's potential as a supplier of crude oil.

Although Chinese developments in oil exploitation are new, the country possesses vast potential, having increased production from less than fifty million metric tons in 1973 to an estimated 100 million metric tons in 1975 to a projection of 400 million metric tons by 1980.²⁶ A proposal has been offered to the Japanese to assist in the development of the Taiching oil field (the primary source of Chinese low sulfur oil) and the building of a pipeline between Taiching and Chu Huan Tau, in return for 10 per cent of China's total output of crude. The offer is nebulous as is the future of Chinese oil production. There is no doubt that China has the oil reserves, but its technology is relatively primitive and increased domestic consumption may reduce the amount of oil and oil products available for export.

²⁶Far Eastern Economic Review, "Peace: Japan's Achilles Heel", 13 June 1975.

Although the attraction of Chinese and Soviet oil is great, they are not Japan's only alternatives. As will be seen in the next section, Japan is engaging in multi-lateral aid programs in an effort to enhance the potential of lesser developed nations (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand).

Equally as great a problem as where Japan will obtain her energy resources is how she will transport them to the homeland. As a maritime power, Japan relies heavily upon continued freedom of the seas and open access to the international straits to get her goods and supplies to and from market. For example, Japan currently receives more than 85 per cent of her oil supplies from the Persian Gulf countries and almost all oil from this area transits the Straits of Malacca.²⁷ The straits are congested, shallow and have recently become a topic of serious concern at the Law of the Sea Conference. If the decision of the Law of the Sea Conference establishes an international twelve mile limit as a rule of law, some 116 straits would fall within territorial seas. This action could lead to the imposition of tolls, subjection of cargo to investigation and the restriction of passage of excessively large tankers as "non-innocent."²⁸

²⁷ Ellingworth, op. cit., p. 15.

²⁸ Far East Economic Review, "Congestion in the Straits", 17 January 1975. Also see the Far Eastern Economic Review article, "Ocean Carve-Up Leaves Japan in Deep Water", 6 June 1975.

Japan maintains an impressive merchant fleet, possessing some of the largest tankers in the world, many in excess of 200,000 tons each. This presents a physical problem in transitting the relatively shallow Malacca Straits as the safe draft is considered to be less than 200,000 tons fully laden.²⁹ Anything in excess of this has only six feet of clearance at some points. In addition, the recent million gallon oil spill created by the Japanese tanker SHOWA MARU in the Straits of Malacca has led to legitimate concern over the dangers of collision and the pollution of valuable fishing waters.

Japan's alternative is utilization of the Lombok Straits which cut between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. These, too have their drawbacks. The transit time and distance is longer (1000 miles and three days longer) and therefore, more expensive. They are even more susceptible to congestion problems because of their excessive narrowness (less than five miles across). The Lombok Straits are becoming a political issue as well, generating demands by Indonesia and Malaysia to declare them territorial waters. The nations' obvious concern over pollution, damage to fishing and possible collisions, may ultimately lead to the same restriction

²⁹ Safe draught, fully laden is considered approximately 62 feet which is about that of a 200,000 ton tanker. Ships between 300,000 and 500,000 dead weight tons are being built and there are numerous 200,000 - 400,000 d.w.t. vessels already in service. (Ellingworth, op. cit., p. 19 and p. 34-35.)

considered for the Malacca Straits. In addition, with the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia to Communist governments, the Japanese fear that further Communist control of Southeast Asia might make future shipping through that region dangerous, even impossible.

Serious thought is being given to the problem by Tokyo's leaders, but the alternatives are few. Shipping around Australia is so expensive as to be unfeasible, and consideration for the development and building of a canal across Thailand's Kra Peninsula is promising, but again, would put the Japanese at the mercy of national whim. Therefore, obtaining, developing and maintaining diverse and productive sources of energy is not enough; Japan must be assured the security of her sea lanes as well.

C. TRADE AND AID: SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST

Japan's very existence still depends upon a foundation of trade and open markets and, until recently, that trade has been almost totally dependent upon the United States as a continuing export base. Some Japanese have been "so much aware of their economic dependence upon our market that they liked to say that, when New York sneezed, Tokyo came down with pneumonia."³⁰ But in recent years, Japan has been hurt, burned, prodded and jarred by American attempts to impose

³⁰Downs, Ray F., and others, Japan: Yesterday and Today, p. 201, The George School Readings on Developing Lands, 1970.

restriction upon Japan's export policies and efforts to increase American investment and to relieve the stringent governmental controls imposed on U.S. businessmen. Perhaps all of this has taught Japan a lesson which is leading her into assuming more confidence in her ability to "make it on her own." Although the United States is still Japan's largest trading partner with an annual total volume of exports in 1972 greater than \$8 billion,³¹ Japan is broadening her horizons and seeking new markets on which to reduce her dependence upon American economic patronage.

Despite the oil crises, 1974 was a good trade year for Japan. Exports continued to increase and imports to decrease. The recorded trade deficit was due largely to the exorbitant increase in the price Japan had to pay for Middle Eastern oil. The fact remains, however, that 1974 still marked a year of domestic recession, and, to offset this at-home crisis, Japan has stepped up her export drive. Disputes with the United States and Europe over dollar-yen deficits, textile imports and foreign investments, coupled with the 1971 Nixon shocks, gave Japan little hope that the West would continue to provide a non-stop outlet for Japanese exports. The result is a dramatic turn to Asia for new, hitherto untapped markets. By 1974 statistics, Asia (including China) now accounts for more than 30 per cent of

³¹Langdon, op. cit., p. 150.

Japan's total trade. The amount of trade with the People's Republic of China alone has increased from \$1.1 billion in 1972 (the year in which Japan opened diplomatic relations) to 3.3 billion in 1974. Japanese exports to China in 1974 were ten times those of 1973.³² (See Tables III, IV and V). Although the figures reflect only approximately one quarter of the total trade with the United States, the significance is great; Japan is actively seeking to reduce her dependency upon the United States. China is concerned that imports to Japan have, until now, consisted mainly of oil, timber and foodstuffs (chiefly soybeans), but Japan is embarking on an active campaign to improve her position with all the countries of Asia and this will, of necessity, open the door to greater imports from her Asia neighbors.

However, if Asia need no longer fear Japanese militarism, she does still fear a Japanese invasion — an economic invasion. Saddled with the need to replenish foreign exchange reserves, the nations of Asia are understandably wary of becoming too dependent upon Japan. Japan, for her part, is attempting to soothe these fears with a new, vastly expanded program of economic and technological aid completely apart from her pro-Western foreign policy. "In the field of economic cooperation with Asian nations, it is now necessary to make a fundamental re-study of the way of our country's aid,

³²Awanohara, Susumu, "Japan Prospers at Asia's Expense", Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 February 1975.

which had been completely incorporated into the Cold War structure."³³ The results have been impressive and have included not only Asia, but Africa and the Middle East as well. New economic interests in Southeast Asia have prompted the spending of as much to that region in foreign aid as is spent on the total national defense effort (i.e. one per cent of the GNP).

Loans to Egypt have been made, totalling 38 billion yen, for the expansion of the Suez Canal. Such a proposed expansion would enable an increase in passable tonnage from 50,000 to 150,000 tons. Three hundred billion yen (approximately one billion dollars) has been granted to Iraq for economic project development, including a project for the separation of crude oil from natural gas. In return, Iraq has agreed to conclude several long-term contracts for the supply of crude oil to Japan. In Iran another 300 billion yen was provided in support of the Bandhar Shahpur petrochemical plant, currently centered on developing facilities for the production of 300,000 tons of ethylene per year. In Saudi Arabia, Japanese financing is being obtained for the building of oil refineries, petro-chemical plants and truck and auto assembly factories. Indonesia, Japan's largest creditor nation (and chief Asian oil supplier) is currently receiving aid for the construction of a 400,000 kilowatt power plant

³³Mainichi Times (Translation), 5 April 1975.

on the Asahan River in North Sumatra and an aluminum refinery with an estimated annual output of 225,000 tons. Even the African states have been the recent recipients of Japanese aid. Guinea requested financing for various domestic economic programs. Japan willingly provided the funds, and, in return, will receive thirteen million tons of bauxite annually with a future possibility of agreements for the receipt of oil and iron ore.³⁴

Japan's motives are obvious, and although not purely altruistic in nature, they have the potential of helping her to solve her economic dilemma. Japan is playing Darwin's game of "survival of the fittest" -- surviving through an uncanny capacity for adaptability. She has had her "coming out" and is convinced that, despite a continuing need for American cooperation and patronage, she can, with a little ingenuity, make it on her own. The newest moves to expand her markets and broaden her sources can only indicate Japan's unwillingness to depend wholly upon any one nation or bloc of nations for her economic security.

³⁴Dollar-yen figures and production estimates for all aid programs were obtained from a series of articles printed in the Yomiuri Shimbun on Japanese aid and foreign investment between 10 April and 30 April 1975.

TABLE III

JAPAN'S TRADE WITH ASIA: 1974 (CUSTOMS - CLEARANCE BASIS)³⁵

COUNTRY/REGION	EXPORTS (f.o.b.)		IMPORTS (c.i.f.) ^c		BALANCE
	VALUE ^a	% CHANGE ^b	VALUE	% CHANGE	
ASIAN REGION	\$ 12,702.7	42.2	\$ 12,448.3	56.5	+ 214.4
South Korea	2,657.0	48.5	1,570.6	30.1	+1,086.4
Taiwan	2,011.1	22.5	952.4	6.9	+1,058.7
Hong Kong	1,360.3	21.7	273.0	- 1.6	+1,087.3
South Vietnam	104.3	20.6	30.5	4.9	+ 73.8
Thailand	951.9	32.2	685.3	74.1	+ 266.6
Singapore	1,388.7	49.3	618.9	177.5	+ 769.8
Malaysia	708.3	58.1	979.3	26.2	- 271.0
Philippines	911.5	47.0	1,103.0	34.5	- 191.5
Indonesia	1,451.6	60.9	4,568.2	106.4	-3,116.6
India	595.0	75.6	656.4	14.2	- 61.4
CHINA	1,986.9	91.1	1,304.6	33.9	+ 682.3
AUSTRALIA	2,000.3	67.7	4,027.9	3.6	+ 83.4
WORLD TRADE	\$ 55,578.6	50.5	\$ 62,076.3	62.0	-6,497.7

^aU.S. \$ x million^bover the previous year^ccost-insurance freight³⁶Awanohara, Susumu, op. cit., p. 44.

TABLE IV

JAPAN'S IMPORTS FROM ASIAN REGION: 1974³⁶

COMMODITIES	VALUE ^a	% CHANGE ^b
TOTAL	\$ 12,448.3	56.5
Foodstuffs	1,497.6	38.7
Fish and Shellfish	557.9	9.0
Textile Raw Materials	174.9	- 1.0
Minerals	1,051.9	48.2
Iron Ore	326.1	14.0
Non-Ferrous Ores	681.8	72.3
Raw Materials	2,286.0	15.3
Timber	1,742.4	12.0
Mineral Fuels	4,950.7	169.0
Chemicals	156.3	77.8
Machinery	351.0	82.3
Others	1,980.0	5.1
Textile Products	955.5	1.4

^aValues in U.S. \$ x million^bover the previous year³⁶Awanohara, Susumu, op. cit., p. 44.

TABLE V

JAPAN'S EXPORTS TO ASIAN REGION: 1974³⁷

COMMODITIES	VALUE ^a	% CHANGE ^b
TOTAL	\$ 12,702.7	42.2
Foodstuffs	221.4	- 8.1
Fish and Shellfish	63.9	- 0.4
Textiles and Textile Prod.	1,377.9	1.6
Cotton Fabrics	73.0	38.9
Synthetic Yarn and Fabric	429.3	8.4
Chemicals	1,582.9	58.3
Fertilizers	316.0	161.9
Plastics	439.2	25.8
Non-Metal Mineral Prod.	163.1	57.5
Metal and Metal Prod.	3,034.3	66.9
Iron and Steel	2,421.5	72.2
Machinery and Equipment	5,230.5	41.4
Textile Machinery	402.9	30.8
Television Sets	99.9	22.4
Radios	130.3	21.0
Cars	557.4	44.1
Vessels	475.5	78.7
Others	1,092.6	53.1

^aValues in U.S. \$ x million^bover the previous year³⁷Awanohara, Susumu, op. cit., p. 44.

III. THE POLITICS OF NON-POWER

A. THE THIRTY YEAR PEACE: 1945-1975

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means for settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency will not be recognized.

ARTICLE IX
The Japanese Constitution
1946

The experience of World War II was a shattering one for the Japanese. The fact that they have been the only people in history to have faced an actual nuclear attack has impressed them deeply, and, in effect, has created a nation of pacifists.³⁸ To a certain extent Article IX was inserted into the post-war Constitution at the direction of the Allies, chiefly as a written assurance that the once awesome Imperial Army would never have the opportunity for regeneration. (Post

³⁸Many experts on Japan have written on and attempted to understand the "new Pacificism". Discussion of the nuclear allergy "phenomenon" and how it has affected the conduct of Japanese foreign and defense policies can be found in: Kahn, Herman, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response, Prentice-Hall, 1970; Reischauer, Edwin, O., Japan: The Story of a Nation, Alfred A. Knopf, Revised 1974; Buck, James H., The Modern Japanese Military System, Sage Publications, 1975.

World War I Germany had seemingly taught the Allies a lesson in fear and caution). Today, Japan is an independent, self-governing nation, no longer responsible to any occupation force, but still deeply conscious of her primary role in the awesome destruction of Asia thirty years ago. As a result, Article IX stands, and, in 1975, Japan remains an economic giant in the body of a military dwarf.

Despite the intent of Article IX, Japan was never fully stripped of its defenses. An actual "armed force", however, did not reappear until 1951 when, in response to open hostilities in Korea, the American occupation forces instituted a 75,000 man Police Reserve Force responsible for maintaining Japan's internal security. Because of her weakened condition, at the same time, in conjunction with the San Francisco Peace Conference, the United States concluded the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan. (Although revised in 1960 and currently operating on a year-to-year basis, the Mutual Security Treaty remains in force essentially as it appeared under initial ratification.) Some Japanese maintain that the initial intent of both Article IX and the Security Treaty was to ban all intrinsic military forces, even those devoted solely to self-defense.³⁹ Americans maintain that the Security

³⁹ The past and present debate over the legality of the Self Defense Forces is testimony to this attitude mostly expressed in the past by members and proponents of the Japan Socialist and Japan Communist Parties.

Treaty was instituted as "the only solution to Japan's defense problems in a perilously unstable part of the world..."⁴⁰ Today, the need for the continued maintenance of the Treaty is being questioned by both sides. Many critics consider the arrangement "unequal" but no one can come to a decision as to unequal to whom.⁴¹ The Japanese public considers the defense alliance to be "more a favor unwisely granted to the United States than an arrangement of benefit to Japan".⁴² Americans, on the other hand, assert that the Treaty has provided the Japanese with a "free ride" on American coattails for nearly thirty years. Japan's gross defense expenditures comprise less than one per cent per annum of her total Gross National Product. Self Defense Force (SDF) manning levels have increased from 206,000 in 1960 to a mere 232,000 by 1972.⁴³ Her per capita expenditures are less than one-tenth those of the United States and

⁴⁰Reischauer, Edwin O., Japan: The Story of a Nation, p. 241, Alfred A. Knopf, Revised 1974.

⁴¹There are many references throughout the literature to the Mutual Security Treaty as an "unequal treaty". For further discussion on the reasons for these attitudes see: Reischauer, Edwin, Japan: The Story of a Nation, Knopf, 1974; and his Introduction to Clapp and Halperin's book United States-Japanese Relations, Harvard University Press, 1974. In regard to the anti-treaty 1960 riots see Langdon, F.C., Japan's Foreign Policy, University of British Columbia Press, 1972.

⁴²Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation, p. 322.

⁴³Langdon, op. cit., p. 12.

less than one-sixth those of West Germany.⁴⁴ (See Tables VI and VII). Despite the fact that a build-up in Japan's defenses would lead to greater autonomy, little effort seems to be brought to bear in that direction. Why? There appear to be several factors working against any substantial proposed build-up plan.

1) Since the 1950's, the Japanese have tended to view their national, regional and international power as purely economic in nature; military power has been relegated to the status of being counter-productive. 2) The Japanese express an almost irritating complacency regarding any threat to their physical security. "Japanese apprehensions focus almost totally on what they regard as their acute and extraordinary economic vulnerabilities."⁴⁵ 3) The consensus in recent years among the voting public has been that the problems of standard of living, education, inflation and pollution are Japan's current critical needs requiring the immediate attention of the government, not an expanded military. 4) Big business interests appear to be staunchly anti-rearmament because of possible damage to overseas markets and sources of raw materials due to adverse foreign

⁴⁴The Military Balance, 1975-1976, p. 76-77, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1975.

⁴⁵Colbert, Evelyn, "National Security Perspectives: Japan and Asia", The Modern Japanese Military System, p. 201, edited by James H. Buck, Sage Publications, 1975.

TABLE VI

COMPARATIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES⁴⁶

<u>Country</u>	<u>Expend/Budget</u> <u>(1975-\$ x Million)</u>	<u>Per Capita</u> <u>\$ (1975)</u>	<u>As % of</u> <u>GNP (1974) ^a</u>
United States	92,800	430	6.0
USSR ^b	103,800	409	10.6
W. Germany ^c	16,260	260	3.6
Great Britain	10,380	184	5.2
France	12,250	233	3.4
<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>4,484</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>0.9</u>
Israel	3,503	1,043	32.0
Italy	4,220	76	2.8
Iran	10,405	314	9.0
Egypt	6,103	163	22.8

^aPercentages calculated in local currency. Where official GNP figures are not available, estimates have been made.

^bEstimating Soviet expenditures are difficult and the figures shown should be used with caution. For rationale and methods of estimation used, consult the source, p. 10.

^cIf financial assistance to W. Germany had been included, the entry would read: 10,812 314 4.3 .

⁴⁶SOURCE: The Military Balance, 1975-1976, p. 76-77, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1975.

TABLE VII

JAPAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES⁴⁷

in \$ x billion converted at 360 yen = \$1.00

FY	<u>Defense</u> <u>Expenditures (A)</u>	<u>Nat'l Budget</u> <u>Expenditures (B)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(C)</u>	<u>A</u> <u>B</u> (%)	<u>A</u> <u>C</u> (%)
1951	.351	2.204	15.102	15.95	2.33
1952	.507	2.590	17.324	19.58	2.93
1954	.375	2.777	21.763	13.51	1.72
1956	.396	3.026	24.701	13.11	1.44
1958	.412	3.703	31.995	11.14	1.29
1960	.444	4.903	44.574	9.07	1.00
1962	.593	7.119	58.860	8.34	1.01
1964	.780	9.279	79.404	8.41	0.99
1966	.946	11.984	105.883	7.90	0.89
1968	1.172	16.157	146.633	7.25	0.80
1970	1.581	22.082	203.436	7.16	0.78
1971	1.863	26.150	226.240	7.13	0.82
1972	2.222	31.854	265.456	6.98	0.84
1973	2.598	39.670	305.000	6.55	0.85
1974	3.036	47.498	365.277	6.39	0.83

⁴⁷ SOURCE: Figures from 1965-1974 are from Nihon no Anzen Hosho (Japan's National Security), a semi-official annual publication. Other figures are from various sources as reprinted in Buck, op. cit., p. 241.

opinion. Surveys conducted over the years have generally netted the following results:

TABLE VIII

SUPPORT FOR EXPANSION OF THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES (%)⁴⁸

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
STRENGTHEN SDF	19	16	16	10	9	11
KEEP IT SAME	49	54	53	42	62	42
WEAKEN SDF	15	14	12	23	5	31
OTHER; DON'T KNOW	<u>17</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>6</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100

The potential revival of militarism is anathema to the people; the Japanese have become a nation of conscientious objectors. In addition, the modern Japanese is intimately concerned with his image abroad, an image which, in many Asian countries, still bears the stigma of the Japanese conqueror. Any build-up, it is feared, might be construed as a rejuvenation of the militarism exhibited in the 1930's.

The existing constitutional ban against possession of offensive forces is probably the most insurmountable obstacle.

⁴⁸Source for Survey: 1960, 1962 and 1972 conducted by the Prime Minister's Office, Public Information Division; 1970 study conducted by Dr. Douglas H. Mendel Jr. as private research; 1973 poll made by Kyodo; 1974 conducted by the NHK broadcasting Network.

The very legitimacy of even a self-defense force is being questioned in the courts. In 1959, a judge further interpreted Article IX to include foreign as well as domestic military presence. A subsequent Supreme Court hearing ruled that Article IX did not include provisions for the prohibition of self-defense (of which the U.S. Forces Japan are a part) but hedged at ruling on the constitutionality of the SDF itself.⁴⁹ However, in September 1973, considering a case involving a public forest preserve slated to be turned over to the SDF, a Japanese court declared the SDF unconstitutional citing Article IX of the 1946 Constitution. The judge's ruling, in part, read:

Article IX of the Constitution bans all armament, including even defensive weapons; it abolishes arms, and denies even the right of belligerency. In view of their scale, equipment and capability, the Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces are land, sea and air forces as specified in Article IX, paragraph 2 and are unconstitutional. The claim that they are necessary for the defense of the country cannot be a basis for denying that they are not military units or war potential.⁵⁰

The Government of Japan (GOJ) argues that the SDF is not in violation because it does not represent the kind of "war potential", in modern terms, prohibited by Article IX. The SDF is organized strictly as a means of military preparedness

⁴⁹McNelly, Theodore, "The Constitutionality of Japan's Defense Establishment", in the Modern Japanese Military System, p. 103-105, edited by James H. Buck, Sage Publications, 1975.

⁵⁰Translated ruling of Judge Shigeo Fukushima, Sapporo District Court, 7 September 1973.

for the defense of the home islands and is prohibited from any dispatch overseas including participation in United Nations missions, peace-keeping forces or police actions. Many GOJ officials have even gone so far as to deny the very existence of a Navy, per se.

Needless to say, the Japanese government gets unnerved at the prospect of SDF law suits and tries to keep such issues out of the courts. However, the 1973 Sapporo decision is still pending in the Supreme Court, whose judges are notoriously conservative. The result will most likely be no decision at all, under the guise that the issue is a political one, or a reversal of the Sapporo ruling.

Despite the fact that challenging the existence of a military force seems unrealistic, the constitutional ban is taken seriously by the Japanese and is currently the greatest obstacle to force build-up. Passage of a constitutional amendment would require a Liberal Democratic Party majority and massive public support, neither of which the current government can claim.

In spite of her pacifist nature, Japan has been making some small attempt at build-up and modernization, mostly at the urging of the United States. As an integral part of former President Nixon's "burden sharing" program, the U.S. has sought to achieve a substantial improvement in Japan's ability for both air and sea defense. The American concept of Japan's responsibility for her own defense includes:

1) close in air defense, including reconnaissance, surveillance and AEW mission,

2) convoy and escort responsibility,

3) ASW and harbor protection.⁵¹

Formal programmed defense plans were not new to the Japanese. As early as 1956, plans were made for a series of four five-year defense build-up programs. The first two (1958-1962 and 1962-1966) were basically quantitative in nature and relied heavily upon U.S. assistance and aid. The Third Defense Plan (1966-1971) began to concentrate more heavily on assuming the harbor protection role including the acquisition of new ships (one equipped with surface-to-air missiles, 14 escorts and two helicopter carriers), five submarines and ASW aircraft. The Ground Self Defense Force acquired 160 new armored vehicles, ten transport aircraft and the replacement of 2800 tanks. The Fourth Defense Plan was the direct result of the Japan Defense White Paper issued in 1970 which stated that Japan would provide for an "independent" or "autonomous" defense with the U.S. Security Treaty acting in a "supplementary relationship".⁵²

⁵¹Fraser, Angus M., Possibilities of Defense Complementarities Between the U.S. and Japan, p. 1, Department of State, 19 July 1974.

⁵²Iwashima, Hisao, "Japan's Defense Policy", Strategic Review, Volume III, No. 2, p. 19, Spring, 1975.

The goals of the Fourth Defense Plan included:

1) GSDF - acquisition of:

280 tanks, 170 armored vehicles, 9 automatic mobile cannon, 90 self-propelled artillery, 159 tactical aircraft and three additional HAWK surface-to-air missile units

2) ASDF - acquisition of:

three more NIKE-J missile sites, 46 F4E-J fighter aircraft, 14 RF4E reconnaissance aircraft, 59 T-2 trainers, 68 FST2 support aircraft and 24 C-1 transports

3) MSDF - acquisition of:

13 escort vessels (including two equipped with helos and one with surface-to-surface missiles), 5 submarines, one supply ship, 92 aircraft (including 87 designated for ASW).⁵³

The Fourth plan's goals were to decrease the overall quantity in all services but to effect substantial qualitative improvements. Unfortunately, the plan has since been abandoned. The oil crises of 1973 and 1974, inflation, soaring production costs and procurement expenses, have effectively cancelled or delayed the majority of programs delineated by the Fourth Plan.

SDF problems extend even further than economics. The prestige of the military in modern Japan is low as is the pay scale. Young Japanese, educated in the anti-militarist doctrine and in the new economic prosperity, see no future in the military. The result is difficulties in recruiting and even more difficulties in retention. The budget is low

⁵³Iwashima, op. cit., p. 20.

and there is little money available for or interest in, research and development. Therefore, the Japanese, historically, have had to depend upon foreign, often outdated technology. "Lack of public interest in defense matters, difficulty in finding a threat and fears of foreign reaction, continue to hamper definition of the problem, much less aid in developing solutions."⁵⁴ This popular trend of preference for a minimum self-defense has generated a military seemingly capable of very little. Says Osamu Kaihara, the former Secretary of the National Defense Council, regarding any potential conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union: "The Ground SDF could fight as an Army for only three or four days; the Air SDF would be destroyed in ten minutes and the MSDF might as well consider the Sea of Japan the Sea of Russia."⁵⁵

It seems that the thirty year "peace" has been a forced one, a product of majority opinion, constitutional law, and the perils of economic superpower status. Nevertheless, Japan does have subtle security worries, and chief among them are the recognition of the possibility of limited wars in Asia and the increase of Sino-Soviet influence in the Far East. Although the present Miki government (as well as those of Tanaka and Sato) have determined to rely upon the United

⁵⁴Auer, James E., The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971, p. 256, 1973.

⁵⁵Buck, James H., op. cit., p. 220.

States as the "deterrent against the threat of wars using nuclear weapons, large scale armed disputes and strategic attacks"⁵⁶ and although they recognize that the probability of an overt attack by either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China is small, Japan does realize that she must be a partner in deterrence because of her great physical vulnerability. Japan generally perceives that any substantial threats to her national security must be on the following order:

- 1) threats to major Japanese shipping lanes caused by potential Communist control of the straits and/or substantially increased Soviet naval activity,

- 2) open hostilities in the Republic of Korea,

- 3) substantial interference with Japanese trade and investments,

- 4) the breakdown of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and/or loss of faith in the validity of U.S. commitments in Asia.

With this in mind, what then are Japan's defense options? The next two sections will explore these -- first the nuclear alternative and last, conventional options.

⁵⁶Langdon, op. cit., appeared as a translation of the Defense White Paper issued by the JDA, October 1970.

B. THE NUCLEAR DEBATE

Much note has been given in recent years to the possibility of Japanese membership in the nuclear elite. No one can dispute the fact that Japan has the technological capability. Some observers have assumed that Japan could detonate a nuclear device, under a crash program, in as little as six months. The problem is -- does the government and, more precisely, do the people, have the will to embark on an active nuclear program? The decision appears to be all the more difficult because it must be a purely political rather than a military one. Since the establishment of the 1946 Constitution, Japan has lived tenaciously by its three point non-nuclear policy (reaffirmed by the 1970 Defense White Paper), that is, "not to manufacture, not to possess and not to bring in such devices."⁵⁷ Despite these strong non-nuclear feelings, the controversy still rages within the Diet whether or not to complete final ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treat (NPT). If ratified and accepted, the NPT will enforce non-production and non-possession of nuclear weapons by the Japanese for a period of twenty years. "The essence of the NPT is that nuclear states undertake not to provide non-nuclear powers...with nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices and not to help

⁵⁷Fraser, op. cit., p. 14.

in their acquisition and that non-nuclear states undertake not to receive nuclear explosive devices or help in their acquisition from any source whatsoever."⁵⁸

Protestations to the ratification of the Treaty (Japan is already a signatory) seem to fall into four main categories. First, the Treaty is deemed politically inequitable (that is, between nuclear and non-nuclear states) by imposing a system of inspections upon non-nuclear, but not upon nuclear members. Secondly, the Treaty reserves to the nuclear powers the right to engage in peaceful nuclear explosions. Third, the obligation of nuclear powers to actively work towards arms control are insufficient. (They have since taken SALT I and SALT II into consideration.) Lastly, fear that commitment to the non-possession of nuclear weapons will seriously affect a nation's physical security and a desire to keep the future option open (especially since the PRC is a non-signatory and since the detonation of a nuclear device by India).⁵⁹ It appears that simple concern for the complete protection of the home islands is creating some hesitancy in making such a long-term commitment. The Liberal Democratic Party publicly wants the NPT ratified providing the following three conditions are met:

⁵⁸Maddox, John, Adelphi Paper # 113, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation", International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 3, Spring 1975.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 4.

1) strict maintenance of the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement and a formal re-affirmation of the U.S. commitment to Japan (technically accomplished with the announcement of Ford's "New Pacific Doctrine").

2) establishment of an effective system of national defense.

3) an increase in budget allocations to be used in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in Japan.⁶⁰

In addition, Foreign Minister Miyazawa has added the proviso that emergency cases may be acceptable for nuclear introduction by the United States if based upon the Security Treaty and with prior consultation with and the approval of the Japanese government (a technical violation of both the NPT and of Article IX of the 1946 Consitution).

The split in both public and governmental opinion regarding ratification is significant in the mere existence of debate. In 1970, the Japan Defense White Paper re-affirmed the non-nuclear policy but also warned against "becoming too dependent upon other nations for defense".⁶¹ Herman Kahn believes that modern technology has caused the Japanese "nuclear allergy" to fade somewhat and describes what he

⁶⁰The Asahi Shimbun, 11 April 1975.

⁶¹Bullard, Monte R., "Japan's Nuclear Choice," Asian Survey, p. 850, Volume XV, No. 4.

calls the "Third Generation Effect".⁶² This, claims Kahn, is the result of a new generation which does not remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki and which has been raised in a culture now dominated by Western influence. Their understandable desire to return to the old culture and traditional values may also lead to increased patriotism and nationalism expressed as the inevitability of Japanese power.⁶³ Still other "Japan watchers" believe that it is no longer feasible for the country to maintain its status as a great economic power without concomitant military power.⁶⁴ Under the assumption that these opinions are valid, what would it take for Japan to develop a nuclear force and what type of force would it require?

First of all, the goals established for the Fourth Defense Plan have been abandoned with little hope for budget increases in the Fifth Plan. However, a second-strike capability force is still feasible without drastically increasing expenditures. A force of twenty SSBNs and 100 strike aircraft would cost an estimated \$20 billion over a period of ten years which would be approximately .7 per cent of the GNP for 1972. Such a sum

⁶²Kahn, Herman, op. cit., p. 6 and p. 9.

⁶³Kahn, Herman, op. cit., p. 9 and p. 14.

⁶⁴Sorenson, Jay B., "Japanese Policy and Nuclear Arms," p. 11-13, National Strategy Information Center, October 1975.

could be relatively painlessly absorbed "without upsetting national priorities."⁶⁵

Secondly, since the United States has ratified the NPT and since it believes that nuclear proliferation contributes significantly to international tensions and instabilities, Japan could not, at least for the near future, expect assistance from the United States (nor from the Soviet Union, given that country's previous experience with China) in the development of such a program. Nevertheless, Japan's technical prowess is wholly capable of developing such a force on its own. Despite Japan's virtually complete dependence upon other nations for uranium, they already possess the capability of refining weapons-grade plutonium.

The most insurmountable obstacle remains the Article IX prohibition. Assuming an amendment to the Constitution can be obtained, what then, if any, are the advantages of a nuclear capability for Japan?

As far as Japan's territorial security is concerned, she is highly vulnerable. Her population and industrial centers are concentrated in a few major urban areas on the main island of Honshu. "Aircraft, now in service, flying from bases in the PRC or Soviet Asia, can strike any significant target in

⁶⁵Muraoka, Kunio, Adelphi Paper #95, "Japanese Security and the United States," p. 26, International Institute of Strategic Studies, February 1973.

the home islands.⁶⁶ Any such attack on the six major target areas: Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kyoto and Kobe, would destroy approximately 60 per cent of Japan's industrial capacity and a large segment of the population.⁶⁷ Despite the seeming conclusion that a first strike against Japan would virtually destroy her will and/or her capacity to retaliate, one cannot stipulate an "unacceptable level of damage." Instead of basing one's judgment "on difficult premises about tolerance for punishment and a nation's will to strive for its goals," one must appreciate "the cardinal premise of deterrence, which is to hold an adversary's population hostage in order to dissuade it from initiating a major attack."⁶⁸ From this viewpoint, a second-strike deterrent force employed on countervalue targets could be of utility, if it meets the following requirements of 1) an effective retaliatory system, 2) a perceptibly capable delivery system and 3) a damage-limiting system to protect Japan's own economic and industrial centers. Such a deterrent might be tactical, strategic or a combination. "The most credible form of deterrent for Japan would be built on a second-strike capability with a mix of offensive and defensive weapons,"⁶⁹ consisting of an

⁶⁶Fraser, op. cit., p. 82.

⁶⁷Fraser, op. cit., p. 83.

⁶⁸Sorenson, op. cit., p. 30.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 33.

SLBM fleet and possibly a defensive ABM system. The most cost-effective system would consist primarily of low-yield plutonium bombs delivered by long-range fighter bombers. Either of the above systems could conceivably provide an adequate deterrent capable of striking Siberian targets and many of the industrial centers of mainland China (although China is slightly less vulnerable because of her widely dispersed population).

The arguments for and against a nuclear capability lean farther toward the feeling that, at least for the present, nuclear weapons would add little to the nation's security while providing fuel for a destructively divisive debate among the populace. A population facing the problems of low wages, inadequate housing and pollution will not easily accept a defense oriented economy, seemingly the end result of a decision to go nuclear. However, there are potential threats and circumstances which could conceivably make that decision an inevitable one.

Japan is highly vulnerable, as much to economic strangulation as to nuclear attack. Her "trade or die" attitude towards policy makes Japan far more dependent upon the vagaries of international cooperation than any other nation. The possibility of seeing her markets threatened, her vital sea lanes denied or her critical resources cut off, could lead to the desire for a stronger defense, including nuclear weapons.

Loss of faith in the American commitment would be another rationale for asserting a nuclear capability. Many Japanese do not feel that the United States would risk a nuclear war in Japan's defense. The experience of Southeast Asia and the Nixon shocks have only been partially compensated for by President Ford's "New Pacific Doctrine." A future American "failure" in Korea or an overt withdrawal of the commitment to Japan could very well force the Japanese into ensuring their security via their own resources, as a military power, surely, as a nuclear power, probably. For the time being, one must assume that the Japanese regard a nuclear capability as irrational, a costly move which would guarantee them nothing and net them little but international suspicion. However, one must be cognizant of the limitations of detente and of the potential for sudden changes in a less than stable international system.

"If the Japanese are able to solve the dilemmas of national security and status without producing nuclear weapons themselves, they may decide permanently to abstain from doing so. If not, and if the alliance with the United States is terminated, Japan could easily go nuclear."⁷⁰

C. JAPAN'S SECURITY OPTIONS

Japan is not facing a future as promising as her past twenty years have been. The exigencies of time and a changing international scene may very well force her to fully accept

⁷⁰Sorenson, op. cit., p. 9-10.

the responsibilities of her status as an economic superpower. If Japan is to maintain that position, some change in her concept of national (and regional) security must be forthcoming. What then are Japan's defense alternatives in addition to the option of nuclear weapons already discussed? They include:

- 1) continued reliance upon the United States - Japan Mutual Security Treaty,
- 2) a gradual, but substantive, build-up in domestic self-defense forces (both quantitatively and qualitatively),
- 3) a return to neutralism.

A continued reliance upon the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty is considered both beneficial and desirable by the present Japanese government. In addition to the obvious economic benefits, the formal commitment tends to ensure that Japan will not be relegated to the status of a political pawn in East Asia. However, critics of the Treaty abound. A survey conducted by Dr. Douglas H. Mendel in 1970, revealed a surprising antipathy to U.S. military presence. Thirty-one per cent of those surveyed were opposed to U.S. presence because of the fear that such an overt presence had the potential of involving Japan in an unwanted Asian war. Thirty per cent considered the bases a public nuisance citing noise, prostitution and G.I. crime and misconduct as rationale. An additional 23 per cent felt that there was no threat to Japan severe enough to warrant the presence of a foreign military force. The remaining 16 per cent was made up of

"Other" or "Don't Know" answers.⁷¹ As a matter of fact, most Japanese consider defense a matter of domestic rather than foreign policy. Despite all of this, the Japanese seem to be convinced that, although there is a danger in close association with the United States, there is a bigger danger in the lack of such an alliance.⁷²

Secondly, there is a move among the members of the U.S. Congress to reduce the expense of maintaining overseas troops and bases. This has resulted in severe military cutbacks in both personnel and support facilities, almost exclusively in the Pacific Region. The question remains whether or not the treaty can remain a viable document solely on the basis of a verbal, rather than a troop commitment. However, in a practical sense, since an actual invasion of the home islands is highly improbable, land based U.S. forces are not an absolute necessity.⁷³ "They (Japan) find it difficult to imagine any adversary finding the occupation of Japan worth the costs."⁷⁴ The force of the Seventh Fleet, utilizing Japanese

⁷¹Mendel, Douglas H. Jr., "Public Views of the Japanese Defense System," The Modern Japanese Military System, p. 174, edited by James H. Buck, Sage Publications, 1975.

⁷²Reischauer, Edwin O., personal interview with the author, 15 September 1975.

⁷³In actuality, there are virtually no operational units currently based on the main island of Honshu.

⁷⁴Sorenson, op. cit., p. 14.

owned and maintained bases and support facilities, appears to be a viable alternative to land based troops. The complete withdrawal of the U.S. physically from Japanese soil need not necessarily damage the alliance providing the "umbrella" remains intact.

Lastly, continuing to rely upon the United States for its national security is feasible provided the Japanese maintain faith in "the commitment." Although few Japanese have the tendency to equate confidence in the American commitment with a need for a stronger domestic defense, the fact remains that the experience of Vietnam and Cambodia has been a somewhat unsettling one. A complete loss of faith would inevitably terminate any effectiveness the Treaty might have as a security measure.

Japan's second option is to embark upon a serious program of gradual, but substantive build-ups in the defense forces. The reasons against such a move have already been discussed. The events which might make such a policy inevitable include:

- 1) a complete lack of faith in the United States' will or in its capability to come to Japan's aid in accordance with the provisions of the Security Treaty,

- 2) the collapse of the Korean Peninsula,

- 3) an appreciable and/or significant reconciliation in the Sino-Soviet dispute,

- 4) a severe threat, from an external source, to the economic, and therefore to the internal, stability of Japan.

This second option, coupled with a loss of faith in the

American security "umbrella" might also conceivably lead to the establishment of a regional security agreement with the other friendly nations of Asia.

The third alternative is to return to a policy of neutralism, a move considered almost impossible given Japan's present status as an economic superpower. However, the prospect of a neutral, unaligned Japan is not totally unfeasible.

These options are not all inclusive. They must be viewed with caution and not taken as a panacea for Japan's future problems. Their probabilities are uncertain and their potential utility is questionable. The Japanese are a highly rational people who can never be expected to do the "right" thing in international eyes, but only that which provides Japan with the widest range of alternatives deemed to be in the best interest of the government and the people. More detailed analysis of these options will be discussed in Chapter V.

IV. THE NEW ASIAN ENVIRONMENT

He Who throws a pebble can change the center of gravity of the earth. All nations ... can affect the course of history. The gravitational attraction between any two bodies ... is directly proportional to their mass Defining mass for political entities is, of course, not easy. It must be a composite of economic, military, political, demographic, moral and other forces. It would also include the capability of exercising creative responsibility in the quest for international equilibrium which is necessary if collisions are to be avoided.

Armin H. Meyer
Assignment: Tokyo

Japan's gravitational attraction to Asian nations of primary security interest is becoming a relatively new element of Japanese foreign policy. For twenty years, Japan has had to face the dilemma of being an economic power that is militarily weak. Such an unstable condition makes assertion of Japan's political "power" difficult, forcing her to seek influence and status by means other than military. However, even this is proving difficult, attempting to further Japanese political and security interests in Asia, while still being considered, in most circles, a pawn of the Americans. As a result, Japan is moving more and more towards developing autonomous policies better in keeping with the advancement of her own independent interests. Her weakness in arms is partially being compensated for with trade, aid and investments, perhaps in an effort to avail herself of a status and a power hitherto only achieved by military force.

A. THE SECURITY GAP: KOREA AND TAIWAN

A study conducted in 1971 by the Stanford Research Institute arrived at the conclusion that the nations of Asia of primary interest to the political and security aspects of Japan's foreign policy included: the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia. Of only slightly lesser importance was the Republic of China (Taiwan).⁷⁵ Relations with Indonesia are relatively good with Japan's chief concern being that country's dominance of the Straits of Malacca, the vital sea lane through which passes the majority of Japanese crude oil from the Middle East. The cases of the U.S.S.R. and the PRC will be considered separately.

Relations with Korea and Taiwan are slightly different, considering the physical security aspects inherent in the continued stability of these areas. The Nixon-Sato Joint Communique of 1969 stated most concisely that "the security of South Korea is 'essential' and the security of Taiwan is 'important'" to the security of Japan.⁷⁶ Still another study referred to "a first priority national interest circle whose perimeter includes Korea and Taiwan."⁷⁷

⁷⁵Stanford Research Institute, Japanese Security Posture and Policy, 1970-1980, p. 173-180, August 1971.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 153.

⁷⁷Gordon, B.K. and Kim, Y.C., Asia Defense Postures, Vol. I, Research Analysis Corporation, Report #RAC-R-132-VOL I, p. 5, September 1971.

Historically, Korea was the key to the conquest of Japan. From China, from Russia, from Mongolia, troops crossed the mountainous terrain with its treacherous winters in the hope of defeating Nippon. The historical analogy of comparing Korea to "the dagger pointed at the heart of Japan" is no longer a completely valid one in this modern age of warfare technology when conventional routes of invasion have lost some of their meaning. However, since the Korean War, Japan views all events on that Peninsula as significant and meaningful. Conversely, "Japan has become a major, even indispensable, factor in South Korea's well being."⁷⁸

Politically, even in recent years, Japan and Korea have never been amicable neighbors.⁷⁹ Residual hostility on both sides, persists. Koreans vividly remember the brutal and repressive occupation by Japan. For their part, the Japanese have traditionally viewed the Koreans as an inferior people. Minor disputes continue today over debated fishing rights, control of the Takashima Islands and the status of Korean nationals residing in Japan. But the disagreements are

⁷⁸ Abramowitz, Morton, "Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers," Adelphi Paper #80, p. 5, International Institute of Strategic Studies, August 1971.

⁷⁹ Korea, here, refers solely to South Korea, although N. Korea is of primary concern to Japan especially in its relations with the South. Japan currently has voiced no open support for re-unification or for full diplomatic ties with the North and is making no serious overtures in that direction.

relatively minor and the security benefits, to both sides, are great.

Although South Korea is rapidly becoming an important area of Japanese trade and investments, militarily, the ROK continues to rely solely upon the protection of the United States. Many feel today that the U.S. intervention in Korea in 1950 was a move directly meant to protect Japan rather than to secure the Korean Peninsula itself.⁸⁰ The move was a stop-gap measure designed to prevent a weak Japan from falling into hostile control. Therefore, the critics ask, does the United States need to continue playing the protector role in Korea or should the burden now fall upon Japan?

The United States went to war in Korea largely because of Japan's potential value in the Cold War. ... The United States has been on the brink of war elsewhere in Asia because of Japan's strategic value as an ally. ... However, while the United States was prepared to fight for Japan ... American leaders also recognized that eventually Japan would have to and ought to reclaim its autonomous position of leadership in East Asia.⁸¹

Recent U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea have led a few observers to believe that Japan should fill the gap, in her own interest as well as in the interest of South Korea. "The U.S. ... might find it a more comfortable arrangement if

⁸⁰Peterson, D.H., Korea: Changing Sphere of Influence, p. 20, Air War College, April 1974.

⁸¹Olsen, Edward A., "The Nixon Doctrine in East Asian Perspective," Asian Forum, Vol. V., No. 1, p. 21, January-March 1973.

she were not so totally committed (to Korea) and if Japan could be brought into some sort of dual superpower agreement to protect the sovereignty of the ROK."⁸² But there are obstacles, not the least of which is the constitutional ban and current Japanese defense policy. However, the outbreak of any hostilities on the Peninsula could "greatly influence Japan's sense of well-being and security and thus, inevitably, Japanese defense policy."⁸³ Another obstacle is the indisputable fact that Korea and Japan dislike and distrust each other. Given the option, Korea would almost certainly attempt to "go it alone" rather than sanction the landing or basing of Japanese troops on Korean soil. Nevertheless, diplomacy and economics often do much to assuage subliminal hostilities. Continued open attempts at honest and friendly relations may alter these feelings. This, plus decreasing U.S. involvement, resulting in a concern for "remote deterrence", and the increasing military capability of the North, could conceivably push South Korea into a more substantial dependence upon Japan.⁸⁴ Although barely plausible today, the alternative is there; changes in Korea's status and further U.S. pullouts may hallmark a concomitant change in Japanese - Korean relations. In the meantime,

⁸²Peterson, op. cit., p. 20.

⁸³Abramowitz, op. cit., p. 5.

⁸⁴Abramowitz, op. cit., p. 12-13.

efforts to improve relations, although of great concern to the government of Japan, are subtle and totally economic oriented.

The U.S. military presence in the South remains highly visible and "the commitment remains strong, but popular support, its flesh and blood, is attenuating ..." ⁸⁵ of greatest concern to Japanese security would be the eventuality of the entire Korean Peninsula falling under hostile (i.e. PRC or Soviet) control.

The People's Republic of China has devoted a great deal of time, financing and military support to the North (the DPRK) beginning with its participation in the Korean Conflict and culminating in the signing of a mutual defense agreement with the DPRK in 1961. There appears to be almost an emotional bond between the Chinese and the Koreans which does not exist with the Soviets. Their relationship goes back many centuries and, historically, the "strategic use made of the peninsula by Japan in its continental expansion ... served only to strengthen the Chinese conviction of Korea's importance to them ..." ⁸⁶ China continues to provide extensive economic aid to the North and by the defense agreement of 1961 pledges continued military support.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 6.

⁸⁶Morley, James W., Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific, p. 55, Walker and Co., 1965.

Soviet interests in the Korean Peninsula are not quite as specific and not of such a long-standing nature. However, given the Sino-Soviet rift, the fear of Chinese encirclement has kept Soviet interest alive, if not intense. They also maintain a mutual defense agreement with the DPRK, but the degree of support, arms and aid to the peninsula probably relates more to the Sino-Soviet dispute than to any real concern for Korean security. "Soviet and DPRK policies generally collide. Korean unification is definitely marginal to Soviet interests. ... Lip service to unification is required, as is material support, but the Soviets are not willing to risk much ..." ⁸⁷

Taiwan's position relative to Japan is perceived as somewhat less of a problem. However, given certain circumstances, Taiwan could be no less formidable a threat. One observer compared the island of Formosa, in hostile hands, to a "giant aircraft carrier" capable of extending its airpower to the South as far as the Philippine Sea and to the North as far as the Southern Ryukyus. ⁸⁸ Taiwan could prove to be a point of leverage, a means of economically strangling Japan if used by a hostile power to achieve hegemony in Asia. A Communist power could make effective use of Taiwan's manufacturing and industrial prowess in an attempt to squeeze

⁸⁷ Abramowitz, op. cit., p. 10.

⁸⁸ Kennedy, William V., The United States in Northeast Asia, p. 6, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 15 December 1974.

Japan out of the Asian economic market. "Japan's economic ties with the Philippine Islands, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma and Thailand could easily be severed."⁸⁹

In addition, control of the sea lanes around the Republic of China (specifically, the Taiwan Straits) could deal a devastating blow to the Japanese shipping of raw materials and petroleum from Indonesia and the Middle East.

Traditional post-war relations with Taiwan have been cordial, though not close. Japanese fraternity towards its neighboring island nation was essentially a policy enforced and dominated by the United States. Severe pressure was applied by the U.S. from the beginning, including a subtle threat that if Japan did not recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan, the United States would not ratify the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.⁹⁰ "Fearing to jeopardize the opportunity to obtain Japan's political and economic independence under the San Francisco Treaty, he (Prime Minister Yoshida) submitted to American pressure."⁹¹ The subsequent implementation of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty strengthened the bond by implicitly including military ties for the defense of Taiwan. The sum total result was a tacit acceptance of

⁸⁹Shelton, C.Q., Taiwan, Rose or Thorn?, p. 6, Army War College, October 1974.

⁹⁰Langdon, F.C., op. cit., p. 94.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 94.

the "Two Chinas" policy and a long term conflict between Japan and the People's Republic of China.

The "Nixon Shocks" of 1971 angered the Japanese and did much to overtly change her policy towards Taiwan. Nixon's actual visit to Peking and the resultant normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC was not the cause of Japanese ire. She was, however, deeply disconcerted by the fact that the trip and its vital implications for Japan and Japanese security had not been discussed with her leaders beforehand. In actuality, it is doubtful that Japan herself had not already seriously considered the economic and political advantages of rapprochement with Communist China. However, with the sudden change in American policy came new questions regarding the status of Taiwan and its security. It became extremely important for Japan to be reassured by the United States that Taiwan would not be allowed to be used as an avenue of aggression "or for the exertion of undue pressures by a mainland power".⁹²

By 1972, diplomatic ties between the Republic of China and Japan were severed. Ambassadors were returned home; Japan Air Lines flights to Taipei and China Air Lines scheduled runs to Tokyo were terminated. The move was initiated by Japan who realized that formal recognition of the government of Chiang-Kai-shek was a primary obstacle

⁹²Kennedy, op. cit., p. 14.

in the development of friendlier political and economic relations with the PRC. It appeared that political expediency outweighed traditional ties. However, if one observes the conduct of affairs between the two countries, it is generally "business as usual". Taipei is still one of the most popular of Japanese tourist spots and trade between the two nations remains open and active.

Japan's chief concern over Taiwan, as it is over Korea, is not political; it is related almost solely to security. Although a "free" Taiwan is both advantageous to and desired by all nations of Asia (except the PRC who has been soft-pedaling previous demands regarding Taiwan in favor of renewed ties with the U.S.) few nations would openly or actively advocate such a policy because of the ensuing damage to relations with mainland China. All the nations of Asia, including Japan, also want to ensure the continued presence of U.S. forces on Taiwan as an added safeguard against a potential threat from the PRC.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has little actual interest in Taiwan. Publicly, they condemn U.S. military presence in East Asia. Privately, they seem to find a relatively strong U.S. presence on Taiwan preferable to any further Chinese expansion. Again, given the conditions of the Sino-Soviet conflict, there is also probably a fear of having the Taiwan Straits being declared territorial waters. The overall Soviet posture towards Taiwan remains a low key one.

Japan's relations with both Korea and Taiwan are enigmatic. Although both nations are perceived to be of great strategic concern to Japan, little effort is being made by the Japanese to stabilize the areas. Despite the fact that the two countries are the keys to both U.S. and Japanese interests in the Far East, Japan prefers to depend almost totally upon the U.S. commitment to guarantee that stability. Despite the fact that further U.S. troop withdrawals threaten to weaken that commitment and despite the fact that both are areas in which the United States would least like to be engaged in a conflict due to the potential for direct involvement by the Sino-Soviet power bloc, the Japanese appear assured of the viability of their present relations. Billions of yen each year are poured into trade investments and into the national economies of South Korea and Taiwan by both Japanese government and big business. Perhaps, the Japanese have discovered that the key to overcoming military weakness is to ensure economic dependence in an effort to make Asia more hospitable.

B. COOPERATIVE ENEMIES: JAPAN AND THE USSR

Within the trends of broken alliances and shifting loyalties, yesterday's enemy may very well become tomorrow's ally. So the United States may attest when one observes current American relations with Germany and Japan thirty years after defeating them in a bloody general war.

Historically, Japan has feared and disliked Russia. Politically, ideologically and culturally, the two countries have been traditionally hostile. But in modern Japan, fears and enmities are yielding to political and economic necessity. Despite their mutual hesitancy, Japan is attempting to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the USSR is highly receptive to the overtures. Aware of the increase in Sino-Soviet influence in the Far East, Japan feels the only means of ensuring a continued stability in Asia is to cement friendships with both Communist powers and to make an overt enemy of neither. The Soviets, for their part, want closer relations in an attempt to woo Japan away from the Chinese camp.⁹³

No peace treaty officially ending World War II hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union has ever been signed. (The USSR was conspicuously absent at the signing of the treaty at San Francisco in 1951.) A major obstacle in concluding such a treaty has been the Soviet claim to the Kurile Islands, that small chain located between Hokkaido and the Kamchatka Peninsula. According to the Soviets, Japan ceded all of the Kuriles and Sakhalin Island to the USSR as a result of the San Francisco Conference and the Yalta Agreement. Japan claims that the Kurile-Sakhalin cession included the eighteen islands upwards from Uruppu, excluding the two Southern islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu. In

⁹³Sorenson, op. cit., p. 49-52.

general, the West supports the claim and agrees that the disputed territory is an integral part of the Japanese home islands. Although the Soviets had offered to negotiate for the return of the Habomai Islands and Shiketan, discussions regarding the Kuriles remained at an effective standstill from 1956 until 1974.

Despite the fact that the Kurile issue is a hotly debated one, the islands are seemingly of little strategic import to either Japan or the Soviet Union. With the Soviet presence on Sakhalin Island, in Vladivostok and at Nakhodka, actual Japanese possession of the Kuriles seems of little significance as a matter of national security, despite the fact that Kunashiri lies only eight miles from the coast of Hokkaido.

However, the fishing grounds off the islands' shores are lush and plentiful. One of the great barriers in previous negotiations was Soviet seizure and confiscation of Japanese fishing vessels operating in the Sea of Okhotsk, off the Kurile coastlines. Finally, in January of 1974, meetings on the "legality" of Japanese fishing and discussions regarding the expansion of fishing rights, led to renewed negotiations on the subject of the Kuriles. The Soviets were amenable to the return of Shiketan and the Habomais in return for concluding a formal peace treaty, but remained adamant in their position regarding the Kuriles. Some observers feel that this hard line attitude has been

adopted by the Soviets "with the belief that any concession on real estate anywhere would open a Pandora's box of Chinese and other border claims against Moscow."⁹⁴ In any event, negotiations have been deadlocked once again.

In addition, Japan is covetous of the wealth of Siberian oil, timber, coal and natural gas so near to her own shores. As discussed in Chapter II, the Japanese and the Soviets initiated agreements for the exploration of various natural resources in both Eastern Siberia and on Sakhalin Island. However, the conclusion of these agreements was hampered by continued tensions and mutual suspicion. The Soviets wanted and needed Japanese capital, but subtly feared contamination by the "Asian capitalists". Japan feared the "possible arbitrary actions by the Russians such as violating contracts, not paying agreed prices, and excluding the Japanese from sufficient inspecting facilities on joint projects,"⁹⁵ in addition to fears of a further industrial build-up in Siberia.⁹⁶ Despite these obstacles the desire for and advantages of joint Siberian development are still there. Although no firm agreements have been signed

⁹⁴Pond, Elizabeth, "Japan and Russia: The View From Tokyo," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 1, p. 146.

⁹⁵Langdon, op. cit., p. 178.

⁹⁶Sorenson, Jay B., Japanese Policy and Nuclear Arms, American-Asian Educational Exchange, National Strategy Information Center, 1975.

or closed contracts written,⁹⁷ the realities of obtaining a near by, low cost source which could considerably reduce Japan's dependence upon Canadian, American and Middle East suppliers, is tempting.

Both an obstacle and an advantage to furthering Japanese political/economic relations with the Soviet Union is the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Soviet leaders were both angered and suspicious in 1972 when Japan formally normalized diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Consequently, the Soviets are intensely concerned with preventing any further alliances between the two countries. Their solution (especially since the January 1976 signing of the "Amity Treaty" between Japan and the PRC) will most likely be an active campaign to woo Japan into the Russian camp. In this respect, access to Siberia's natural resources could be used as a lever to pressure Japan into further concessions.

At the same time, Japan has managed to maintain some working leverage over the Soviets. Trade is not a

⁹⁷ The Japanese have since backed out of any firm commitment to the Tyumen/Yakutia exploration program, probably more due to the facts that 1) American oil companies have declined an invitation to participate, 2) the Soviets have failed to arrive at reasonable agreements regarding site surveys, financing and volume of resources to be made available for export and 3) there have been doubts about the quality of Tyumen oil because of a suspected high sulfur content. (Langdon, op. cit., p. 179 and the Far Eastern Economic Review).

particularly important aspect.⁹⁸ However, a need for Japanese capital in the development of Siberia could prove a valuable bargaining point in the future.

Secondly, there is the consideration of the potential vulnerability of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and its support facilities at Vladivostok. The Russians must rely upon the Tsushima Straits between Korea and Honshu, and the Tsugaru Straits, for access to the Sea of Japan (especially in the event of a naval deployment against Communist China). "Other routes to the open seas are available to the Russians, but each has limiting factors that reduce the feasibility of its use."⁹⁹ If, after the Law of the Sea Conference, the Tsugaru Straits become territorial rather than international waters, or if there is a move to cement relations between the PRC and Japan even further, the Soviets could face a severe blow to their Pacific Fleet mobility. Without such mobility and/or the support facilities at Vladivostok, the "Soviets could be hard pressed to protect the maritime Provinces, or to bring military pressure to bear on China's southern flank. Japanese good will...is therefore essential."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸It is estimated that even by 1980, the Soviet Union will account for less than five per cent of Japan's trade. (Sorenson, op. cit., p. 48.)

⁹⁹Sorenson, op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 51.

The Japanese appear to view stable relations with the Soviet Union as advantageous, but not critical. It is highly improbable that they would damage their partnership with the United States or their rapprochement with the PRC by engaging in any firm commitments to or bilateral agreements with, the Soviet Union.

C. COOPERATIVE ENEMIES: JAPAN AND THE PRC

From 1951 until September 29, 1972, relations with China were distant, despite the fact that trade relations prospered, a fact which emphasizes the Japanese government's policy of separating economics from politics. U.S. refusal to acknowledge the Communist regime as China's legitimate government and Japan's own "Two Chinas" policy proved to be the unbridgeable gap to normalization of political relations. China refused to accept economics without politics and accused Japan of perpetuating instability in Asia by consorting with the American "aggressors" and by supporting the government of Chiang-Kai-shek. However, within Japan itself, a dilemma was building. Trade with the PRC was important, but the peace treaty with Nationalist China was seemingly inviolate. "As Tokyo's China fever intensified, a schizophrenia developed in Japan's body politic."¹⁰¹ Finally, in September, 1972, Japan followed the American lead and

¹⁰¹Meyer, Armin H., op. cit., p. 155.

severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of mainland China. The implications of that move are only beginning to be felt.

In January 1976, Japan concluded the much debated "Amity Treaty" with the PRC, taking still another step toward full accord with their largest Asian neighbor.¹⁰² The "Amity Treaty", despite its apparent impact upon Japan's position on Taiwan deliberately avoided committing Japan to agreeing unequivocally to the PRC stance that Taiwan is within the territorial sovereignty of the mainland. Clause Three of the original Sino-Japanese Communique of September 1972 stated: "The Government of the People's Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand..."¹⁰³

The economic aspects of rapprochement also have the potential of being extremely lucrative for Japan. In addition to the Taiching oil project (discussed in Chapter II)

¹⁰²The so-called "Amity Treaty" has been pending since 1972. The delay in ratification was caused by arbitration over the PRC inserted "hegemony clause". China had insisted the treaty include a clause denouncing the potential of any nation to establish hegemony in Asia. It is interesting to note that the title of "Peace Treaty" was deliberately avoided. Also interesting is the fact that there is virtually no mention of the traditional Chinese objection to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

¹⁰³Ishikawa, Tadao, "The Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations," United States-Japanese Relations, p. 155, edited by Patricia Clapp and Morton Halperin, Harvard University Press, 1974.

is the opportunity for an expanded trading partner. Japan currently accounts for virtually 25 per cent of China's total imports with the future predicting a significant increase.¹⁰⁴ Also a problem, potentially resolved by the new relations, is previous antagonism over fishing rights. The PRC has barred Japanese fishing over the stretch of coast from Shanghai to Chekiang provinces under the pretext that the region has been declared a "military security area". Japan, on the other hand, has viewed the act as an arbitrary demarcation of international waters. Such problems as these may be solved between two countries who now can communicate openly and officially.

At initial glance, the benefits to China of diplomatic normalization are much more obvious and tangible than those to Japan. It has, at least superficially, solidified Chinese claims regarding Taiwan and has improved here international maneuverability. Nevertheless, there are advantages for Japan. The economic aspects have already been mentioned, as well as the advantage of diplomatic "problem solving". In addition, the move may enhance Japan's position on the international scene. "Because of the emergence of multipolar international situations, Japan can no longer completely depend upon the United States...and consequently Japan must

¹⁰⁴ Sorenson, op. cit., p. 53.

become more self-reliant in the pursuit of its national interests through diplomacy."¹⁰⁵

The disadvantage is obvious. Normalization of relations with China can have a profound and damaging effect on continued relations with the Soviet Union.

It appears that Japan, almost of necessity, is straddling the political fence, striving to maintain close political ties with the United States and her Western allies while, at the same time, cultivating friendships among the Communist states. Her basic dilemma is the absolute necessity of closing the gap between former adversaries without being inadvertently caught in the middle of the Sino-Soviet strain. "But if they succeed in their diplomacy with Moscow and Peking, while successfully maintaining close ties with the United States, they will have accomplished a major feat of diplomacy."¹⁰⁶

D. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

The nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict is the fine line which Japan must tread between relations with the USSR and with the PRC. The conflict had its genesis in the mid 1950's when, at the same time that Khrushchev was "expressing

¹⁰⁵Ishikawa, op. cit., p. 161.

¹⁰⁶Sorenson, op. cit., p. 55.

increasing dedication to peaceful coexistence as the main line of Soviet policy", Mao-Tse-tung moved "to a more belligerent stance."¹⁰⁷

Intensified by the signing of the Moscow Treaty in 1963, the rift developed into publicly acknowledged differences in interpretation of Communist doctrine. The ideological split effectively destroyed the much touted myth of total Communist unity and was destined to have an impact upon the nations of Asia, including Japan.

The Sino-Soviet conflict, in its relation to Japan, is both an advantage and a threat. The Japanese fear the possibility of the ideological schism becoming a "hot" war,¹⁰⁸ with the associated eventuality of being drawn into or threatened by, open warfare on mainland Asia. Secondly, any overtures by Japan toward one country are viewed with hostility and suspicion by the other.¹⁰⁹ Thus, Japan must tread warily, weighing the advantages and the risks of better relations with each.

¹⁰⁷Clemens, W.C., Jr., The Arms Race and The Sino-Soviet Relations, The Hoover Institution, p. 43, 1968.

¹⁰⁸This is not an irrational fear. On several occasions the split has erupted into border skirmishes.

¹⁰⁹This could be the real reason for Japanese hesitancy in committing themselves to the Tyumen project. Japanese funding to build a new Trans-Siberian railroad could only be looked upon as a threat by the Chinese who would view any build-up in Eastern Siberia as military potential.

On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet conflict serves as a benefit. Each of the two Communist nations, seeking to legitimize their power, and their ideology, view Japan as both the barrier to and the cornerstone of their interests in the Asian sphere. If Japan is cautious, the split can greatly increase her political maneuverability.

"...(N)egotiations about trade and development find Japan with considerable ability to maneuver in the setting created by the Sino-Soviet split."¹¹⁰ Thus, it may serve as a point of leverage over which the Japanese may exert some control.

Secondly, the conflict ensures some semblance of stability in East Asia by effectively reducing the perils of a joint threat and by placing tacit controls on each of the countries regarding any overtly aggressive or expansionist policies. As long as the possibility of Sino-Soviet entente remains remote, neither the Chinese nor the Soviets would permit Asian hegemony by the other.

¹¹⁰Kahn, op. cit. p. 174.

V. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE

In the past the Japanese had weathered, with a minimum of disorder and lost motion such traumatic shocks as ... the awful collapse at the end of World War II. Since then they had girded their economic and political cause with consummate skill. Once again stormy seas lay ahead, but there seem(s) good reason to expect Japan to rise to the challenge.

Edwin O. Reischauer
Japan: Story of a Nation

Japan's future security posture is not a matter of clear-cut choice. It involves a number of options and alternatives. Any attempt to analyze these policy alternatives must include an examination of 1) Japan's concept of her external interests, 2) her perceptions of the threats to those interests, 3) her view of the U.S. security role and 4) the attitudes of others towards Japan and potential Japanese military power.¹¹¹

Generally, Japan's future alternatives encompass five major choices, any one or more of which might possibly be pre-determined or made inevitable given a concomitant set of circumstances and/or events. The five are:

1) continue to rely upon the support, security and protection afforded by the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty,

¹¹¹Osgood, op. cit., p. 157.

2) embark upon the pursuit of a policy of unarmed neutrality,

3) look towards the Soviet Union and/or the People's Republic of China for direct security via formal alliances and bilateral agreements,

4) embark upon a policy of total military independence based on an all-out rearmament effort including the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons,

5) consolidate Japan's national security interests with those of the other Asian nations by means of multilateral guarantees.

Table IX establishes an a priori level of plausibility for each alternative and delineates the given set of events or circumstances which could lead to the selection of that alternative as a matter of policy. First, the general feasibility of each major alternative will be discussed followed by an examination of the potential circumstances.

1. Continued Reliance Upon the U.S.

A continued reliance upon the United States is the most plausible and seemingly, the most rational alternative. Despite Japan's increasing desire for and policy moves towards a greater degree of autonomy, the differences between U.S. and Japanese perceptions regarding security and defense are narrowing somewhat and the ones that remain show greater hope of accommodation. In addition, Japan would not be likely to attempt the Gaullist France "go it alone" approach

TABLE IX

JAPAN'S SECURITY POSTURE (1980's)CIRCUMSTANCES & EVENTS

		MOST PLAUSIBLE	LESS PLAUSIBLE
			BARELY PLAUSIBLE
ALTERNATIVES	Continued Reliance upon the U.S. Security Treaty	Continued economic growth and int'l stability	Further Sino-Soviet rift
		Effective US-USSR-PRC balance in W. Pacific	Increased tensions on Korean Peninsula
		Continued dominance by IDP party	Disbanding of the SDF
LESS PLAUSIBLE	Unarmed neutrality	IDP/Socialist coalition government	New surge of Japanese nationalism
		Stable detente with PRC & USSR	
	Rearmament and possession of nuclear weapons	Renewal of Korean hostilities	Seizure of sea lanes by hostile power
		Sino-Soviet rapprochement	Continued nuclear proliferation among 3rd world nations
		Japanese lack of faith in the US commitment	PRC takeover of Taiwan
			Total US withdrawal from the Pacific
			Total economic upheaval

TABLE IX (CONT'D)

CIRCUMSTANCES & EVENTS

CIRCUMSTANCES & EVENTS		ALTERNATIVES	
MOST PLAUSIBLE	LESS PLAUSIBLE	BARELY PLAUSIBLE	BARELY PLAUSIBLE
Bilateral agreements with the PRC or the USSR	Japanese lack of faith in the US commitment	Total abrogation of the US commitment	
Multi-lateral agreements with the Asian states	Threats to the Malacca or the Lombok Straits		Resurgence of Pan-Asian nationalism Communist hegemony in Asia

unless she were both completely willing to and capable of assuming the total responsibility for her own defense. The limitations to the total independence approach were delineated in Chapter III and encompass far more than mere technological ability and prowess.

Nevertheless, this alternative does depend upon the existence of a base case, a scenario whose chief characteristics rely upon the success of detente, continued economic prosperity and an acceptable level of political and military stability in East Asia, as well as upon the maintenance of internal Japanese power by the Liberal Democratic Party. To a slightly lesser extent, the realities of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the unresolved problem of Korea and the possibilities of these areas of tension becoming areas of overt hostilities, will force the Japanese to reassess their physical vulnerabilities. Conversely, renewed rapprochement between the Chinese and the Soviets could lead the Japanese to perceive a dual threat. Unlike Europe, Japan has two major Communist powers bordering her shores. The Treaty has worked effectively for both Japan and the United States for twenty-five years;¹¹² there is no reason, given the base case, why it cannot continue to be a viable relationship into the 1980's.

¹¹² Despite the charges of a "free ride" by Americans and the feeling that the Treaty is a "necessary evil" by the Japanese, no one can dispute the fact that its existence has been a significant contribution to the power balance in Northeast Asia.

Some experts say that Japan is Asian merely by an accident of geography, that her economic, political, and social outlook is almost totally Western in nature.¹¹³ Others say that the Japanese, traditionally insular, historically isolated from the international scene, have been confused by the Western influence. Desirous of both maintaining tradition and pursuing the "economic miracle", the Japanese are torn and therefore, unpredictable. A new surge of Japanese traditionalism (nationalism, if you wish), could spawn the end of the Treaty partnership.

In any event, assuming the base case and the continuation of the Treaty, major readjustments would have to be made, by both sides, for it to remain a viable agreement. A new treaty would be drafted, reducing U.S. visible presence to an absolute minimum, delineating specific terms of the U.S. defense commitment and establishing the boundaries of Japanese defense responsibilities. Such a revision would do much to allay American fears of another Vietnam and to decrease the feeling by many Japanese that the Treaty remains an unwelcome vestige of the Occupation.

2. Unarmed Neutrality

Unarmed neutrality is a policy often touted by the minority political parties. It is a policy that apparently

¹¹³Reischauer, personal interview, 15 September 1975.

stems from the roots of a people steeped in war guilt and a feeling of strong antipathy to military power. Although Japan is becoming increasingly more self-confident and is exhibiting a new concern for "things Japanese", this new nationalism "correlates not with hawkish views on defense, but rather with neutralism ... and hostility to both the SDF and American bases."¹¹⁴ In recent years the Nixon doctrine and its demands for "burden-sharing" generated a new spate of anti-militarism which could prove strong enough to turn the Japanese populace away from the SDF and the Mutual Security Treaty.

In addition, effective detente with the USSR and the PRC will reduce any apparent need for expansion of the Self Defense Force or any substantial military force, domestic or foreign. Complete U.S. troop withdrawal from Japan coupled with the loss of LDP power could make such a policy of neutrality highly feasible.

However, neutrality is only possible if Japan can make the assumption that there is a minimal threat to her own security and can be tolerated only if Japan presents virtually no threat to anyone else. This era of multilateralism, of powers and superpowers, appears to make this alternative less feasible. Under consideration must be: 1) Japan's economic superpower status and the direct effect her economic

¹¹⁴Mendel, op. cit., p. 157.

policies have on other nations, 2) the fact that the United States is no longer the strategic force in the Western Pacific and 3) the fact that Japan has reached a point in her status where she must assume the responsibilities of a major power, not withdraw from them.

3. Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons

The policy choice most feared by all nations involved directly or indirectly, with Japan, is the possibility of opting for full-scale rearmament. The practical obstacles to rearmament and nuclear possession were discussed in Chapter III. However, an international scenario which strays from the base case might make these practical barriers far less significant.

In recent years, Japan has discovered that her external interests are no longer limited to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and the Sea of Japan. Her unbridled economic growth has, of necessity, expanded both her sphere of influence and her area of interest to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, even to Europe and North America. Her economic status and power have opened opportunities to Japan often available only to those nations with military power sufficient to secure and protect them. Herman Kahn, for example, does not believe that Japan will remain satisfied with her secondary military role and traditional "low posture" policy.¹¹⁵ Another critic

¹¹⁵Kahn does stop short of "predicting" a resurgence of militarism. He merely classes Japan as a potential "super-state", but does not commit himself to asserting what kind of superstate, purely economic/technological, or otherwise. (The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response)

says "economic power alone cannot afford the basis for an adequate foreign policy. It assumes that Japan's economic growth poses no threat or challenge to the rest of the world. ... On the other hand, a policy dependent upon the U.S. security guarantee may prove too restrictive or impermanent for a Japan bent on world power."¹¹⁶ Their low risk, low posture, post-war policy has worked exceedingly well for them. However, this trend of adapting and reacting solely to outside pressures may be forced to give way to an active, initiative policy in the 1980's.¹¹⁷ The need for protection of raw material sources, supplies and routes must be guaranteed. If there comes a time when the sea lanes fall into hostile hands, they can only be secured by force. The crucial ingredient to the avoidance of the rearmament choice lies in the American commitment. Further indications¹¹⁸ of actual or perceived U.S. failure to meet the commitment, total U.S. withdrawal from the Western Pacific, or a Japanese lack of faith in that commitment would, inevitably, lead to Japan's seeking security elsewhere, most probably in her own arms. Without the American commitment, the probability of a new Korean War increases, as does the heretofore remote possibility of Korea falling into Soviet or Chinese hands.

¹¹⁶Sorenson, op. cit., p. 12-13.

¹¹⁷Buck, op. cit., p. 222.

¹¹⁸Some Japanese feel the U.S. pullout from Vietnam was the first indicator.

Once the decision to rearm has been made, the logical extension is to the acquisition of nuclear arms, especially if given the case of continued proliferation among the Third World nations. If Japan, for any reason, caused by any external or internal circumstance, insists upon or is forced into embarking on a totally independent defense policy, she would be signalling a policy of "full scale rearmament including the production of nuclear weapons."¹¹⁹

4. Bilateral Agreements

Currently, Japanese overtures towards Communist China and the Soviet Union have been in the realm of cultural and economic exchanges as discussed in Chapters II and IV. Political agreements, although important and marking a slight shift in post-war Japanese policy, have not been of any intrinsic substance¹²⁰ and have in no way implied any resemblance to military alliances or security pacts.

Closer ties with her former enemies is inevitable, and, in the case of certain diplomatic and economic agreements, highly beneficial. The 1980's will definitely mark an era of lesser economic dependence upon the Middle East, most probably via agreements for Tyumen oil with the Soviet Union

¹¹⁹Stanford Research Institute, op. cit., p. 154.

¹²⁰The most notable exception being the signing of the "amity treaty" with the PRC. The consequences of this document have the potential of being far reaching ones.

and/or developments of the Taiching oil fields in China. Both nations will actively step up their campaigns for closer relations with Japan in hopes of reducing the other's level of Asian influence.¹²¹ Former Ambassador Reischauer sees a new era of relations between Japan, the Soviet Union and the PRC, but believes that only total abandonment by the United States could give Japan impetus enough to turn to the Chinese or the Soviets. "... (E)ven if Japan and the United States should drift apart ... neither is likely to develop a relationship with China or the Soviet Union that could be a substitute for their present relationship with each other."¹²²

5. Multilateral Agreements

Japanese are taught from childhood to avoid shame and embarrassment and to be highly conscious of the esteem in which others hold them. "This ... makes the individual Japanese a very self-conscious person. 'What will they think of me?' is always the first thought. ... Even the most humble Japanese feels himself to be on a stage before his fellow countrymen and the whole world."¹²³ This feeling of

¹²¹The 1980's will most likely bring a satisfactory agreement regarding the Northern Territories. However, rather than being of any real political or military substance, such an agreement would be the "leverage" exerted by the Soviets for diplomatic or economic gain.

¹²²Reischauer, Clapp and Halperin, op. cit., p. 4.

¹²³Reischauer, Edwin O., United States and Japan, p. 143, The Viking Press, 1968.

self-consciousness has overflowed into postwar Japanese policy. The desire to be friends to all and enemies to none, coupled with the remnants of war guilt, have bred a Japan strongly cognizant of world opinion, especially among the nations of Asia which she helped to decimate some thirty years ago. However, this concern for Asia is recent and has manifested itself in terms of aid, investment and economic assistance, not in terms of any resurgence of pan-Asian nationalism or spirit of "Asia for the Asians." In reality, Japan has very little in common, socially or economically, with her Asian neighbors. The prospects for any regional security pact or multilateral agreements in the 1980's are the most remote. First of all, the vestiges of fear, suspicion and caution regarding Japan and Japanese enterprise remain in the minds of a once defeated Asia. Potential rearmament is the crux of this fear. The slightest growth or modernization within the Self-Defense Forces raises the perennial spectre of resurgent Japanese militarism. The eventuality of a regional security pact "seems conceivable only as a defensive response to serious threats or actions originating directly or indirectly from one of the two principal Communist powers."¹²⁴ As the undisputed "key to the Pacific", any such arrangement without agreed upon Japanese leadership would be doomed to failure.

¹²⁴Stanford Research Institute, op. cit., p. 169.

For Japan's part, it would require an exceedingly severe threat to her physical or economic well-being to prompt such a move. Any pact with the potential to involve her in unwanted limited wars in Southern Asia would be unacceptable to the Japanese people.

B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES

It would be virtually impossible, given the constraints of time and space, to develop a full scenario under which each of the causal circumstances in Table IX could occur. Suffice it to say that each event or circumstance is within the realm of plausibility and each event or circumstance, taken singly or in multiples, could either stabilize or destroy the base case. No attempt will be made to predict the circumstance leading to the alternative. Instead, given the background of Chapters I through V, it is believed that a set of circumstances can be interpreted as a rational indicator of the most plausible alternative. (Table IX)

1. The Economic Outlook

Japan's economic "miracle" of the 1950's and 1960's cannot be maintained. The realities of an effectively closed technology gap, the utilization of critically needed oil resources as a political weapon and the vagaries of an international finance situation that breeds inflation-recession-inflation, will prohibit a continued ten per cent per annum growth rate. However, anything short of economic

upheaval¹²⁵ will assure Japan of relative economic stability, probably in the realm of a four to five per cent per annum growth.¹²⁶

The 1980's will mark a concerted effort by Japan to further diversify her sources of raw materials, maximize her economic options and reduce her market dependency upon the United States. Whereas trade has been Japan's lifeblood in the past, continued economic viability will entail detailed efforts to overcome her present economic and resource problems. Such efforts will require a greater expenditure of Research and Development funds (probably in excess of two per cent of the GNP). Another option would be for Japan to engage in exploratory mining operations off the continental shelf in search of oil and gas deposits. Similar explorations could be anticipated within Japanese territorial waters (recently extended to twelve miles).

Diversification of sources will, of necessity, also mean an expanded effort to achieve substitutes with available resources. Such an R&D effort would include methods to

¹²⁵It should be noted that total economic upheaval is not as implausible as it may sound. Given Japan's extreme economic vulnerabilities, continued inflation, severance of supply routes or a prolonged "oil crisis" akin to that experienced in 1973, industrial production could come to a virtual standstill.

¹²⁶Even at this rate, Japan would surpass the Soviet Union by the early 1980's (Paige, F.D., U.S. - Japanese Relations: Cooperation or Confrontation, Air War College, April 1974).

reduce the critical need for oil, such as in the development of non-petroleum based synthetics (e.g. organic plastics), and in the employment of nuclear/solar energy.¹²⁷

Trade with the United States will begin to achieve a more equitable balance, hopefully easing past and current tensions in this regard. The Japan Economic Research Center generally has predicted the following:

TABLE X

Balance of Trade, 1980 Projected (in \$ x million)¹²⁸

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>% Increase</u>	
				<u>1960-70</u>	<u>1970-80</u>
TRADE					
BALANCE	440	1,410	5,795	--	--
Japan exports					
to the U.S.					
(fob)	2,510	6,020	26,751	18.4	16.1
Japan imports					
from the					
U.S.	2,070	4,610	20,956	12.4	16.1

A new, more acceptable balance of trade must be achieved and maintained. Any severe economic trauma, such as a trade war, could serve to effect a permanent, irreparable schism in the U.S. - Japan partnership.

¹²⁷One source speculates that Japan is technologically capable of engaging in experimentation with controlled nuclear fusion for peaceful purposes (Stanford Research Institute, op. cit., p. 331).

¹²⁸Japan Economic Research Center, "Japan's Economy in 1980 in the Global Context," p. 12, March 1972.

Japan will reduce somewhat, her near total dependence upon the U.S. market. Trade with the Soviet Union, the PRC and the lesser nations of Asia will increase significantly but will not constitute an adequate alternative to the U.S. Barring a radical change from the base case, such as open warfare in East Asia, Japan's economic stability is relatively assured, despite continued pressures and external demands.

2. Political Determinants

Despite the historic success of the LDP, the party has no monopoly on the future. Its majority is being steadily eroded within the Diet and dissatisfaction with its handling of welfare policies such as pollution, the housing shortage, inflation and social security is causing it to lose its power with the Japanese people.

Odds favor an end to LDP majority in the Diet upper house, but the Party will more than likely retain the lower house until the mid 1980's. Tables XI and XII indicate the general decline of LDP and DSP majorities. What they do not indicate however, is the steady erosion of LDP polling power. Disenchantment with the ruling LDP is leading to a slow, but steadily creeping increase in Socialist and Communist seat gains, despite the fact that the majority of Japanese polled fear and dislike any radically oriented party. The JSP is showing a marked tendency towards moderation and emphasizes its support from labor organizations and the "working class."

TABLE XI

NO. OF ELECTED REPS IN DIET BY PARTY (1955 - 1972)¹²⁹

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>APR</u> <u>1955</u>	<u>MAY</u> <u>1958</u>	<u>NOV</u> <u>1960</u>	<u>NOV</u> <u>1963</u>	<u>JAN</u> <u>1967</u>	<u>DEC</u> <u>1969</u>	<u>DEC</u> <u>1972</u>
LIBERAL DEMS	297 ^a	287	296	283	277	288	271
SOCIALIST	156 ^b	166	145	144	140	90	118
COMMUNIST	2	1	3	5	5	14	38
KOMEI TO	---	---	---	---	25	47	29
DEM SOCIALIST	---	---	17	23	30	31	19
OTHERS ^c	8	13	6	12	9	16	14
	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL	463	467	467	467	486	486	489

^aincludes the combined totals of two conservative parties prior to their merger into a single party in Nov. 1955.

^bincludes the combined totals of two socialist factions that were merged in October 1955.

^cincludes minor parties and independents

¹²⁹Area Handbook for Japan, Department of the Army, 1974, p. 346.

TABLE XII

RESULTS OF GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR HOUSE OF¹³⁰
REPRESENTATIVES, 1955 - 1972

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>APR</u> <u>1955</u>	<u>MAY</u> <u>1958</u>	<u>NOV</u> <u>1960</u>	<u>NOV</u> <u>1963</u>	<u>JAN</u> <u>1967</u>	<u>DEC</u> <u>1969</u>	<u>DEC</u> <u>1972</u>
<u>LIBERAL DEMS</u>							
Seats:	63.6	61.5	63.4	60.6	57.0	59.3	55.0
Votes:	63.2	57.8	57.6	54.7	48.8	47.6	46.9
<u>SOCIALIST</u>							
Seats:	33.4	35.5	31.0	30.8	28.8	18.5	24.0
Votes:	29.2	32.9	27.6	29.0	27.9	21.4	21.9
<u>COMMUNIST</u>							
Seats:	0.4	0.2	0.6	1.0	1.0	2.9	7.7
Votes:	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	10.5
<u>KOMEITO</u>							
Seats:	---	---	---	---	5.1	9.7	5.9
Votes:	---	---	---	---	5.4	10.9	8.5
<u>DEM SOCIALIST</u>							
Seats:	---	---	3.6	4.9	6.2	6.4	3.9
Votes:	---	---	8.8	7.4	7.4	7.7	7.0
<u>OTHERS</u>							
Seats:	2.5	2.7	1.3	2.5	1.9	3.3	3.3
Votes:	5.6	6.7	3.2	4.9	5.8	5.5	5.3

¹³⁰Area Handbook for Japan, Department of the Army,
p. 347, 1974.

By 1980 the LDP will most likely retain enough majority to maintain governmental control. However, by the mid 1980's an LDP/Socialist coalition government is a highly plausible occurrence, but one which does not necessarily have to mean a sudden or drastic shift in policy. The result, of necessity, would be a middle-of-the-road government, leading essentially to a general policy of neutrality. Neutrality would not however, have to be a force to abrogate the Mutual Security Treaty. Although there would be no physical U.S. presence, the likelihood exists for the maintenance of "emergency bases" for use in a crisis and adherence to the U.S. commitment for nuclear and long-range naval protection.

Any other political alignment is unfeasible, barring a drastic political or economic upheaval. A united front between the JSP and the JCP is the most implausible future given the extent of internal factionalism within both parties, and the deep fear of the JSP of Communist ideological extremism.

It should be noted that despite the erosion of LDP polling power, subtle changes in policy (especially domestic affairs) could shift the balance back to LDP favor.

3. The Four Power Balance

The most significant stabilizing force in Northeast Asia for the past thirty years has been the maintenance of a relatively effective four power balance between Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of

China. The chief contributors to securing and maintaining that balance have been the U.S. - Japan alliance on the one hand and the Sino-Soviet conflict on the other.

The fear of Asian "encirclement" by one Communist power against the other has achieved a level of stability with its own built-in guarantees. Any aggressive, expansionist move on the part of one is assured of a hostile reaction by the other. Since neither country appears to be willing to involve itself in an extended regional conflict with the attendant possibility of a direct military confrontation, both the PRC and the Soviet Union maintain relatively "low key" postures in regard to their Asian interests.

Secondly, Japan has often been considered the "key" to the Pacific balance, both diplomatically and economically. The U.S. - Japan alliance has heretofore prevented Japan from becoming an unwilling pawn in any attempt to disturb that balance. Despite Soviet and Chinese protests regarding U.S. military presence in Japan (and elsewhere in East Asia), such a presence is apparently preferable to the creation of a void into which their Communist counterpart could move.

The crucial element in preserving the power stability into the 1980's is the cooperation of all four countries involved. Withdrawal of the U.S. commitment, an appreciable increase in Sino-Soviet hostilities or conversely, a Sino-Soviet entente, could create an instability leading eventually to one power hegemony in Northeast Asia. Additionally, actual or perceived Japanese full-scale rearmament would be

a force so disruptive to the balance as to almost guarantee a resulting Sino-Soviet "defensive" entente.

4. The Military Outlook and Nuclear Proliferation

The fact that the mission of Japan's Self-Defense Forces has remained virtually unchanged since 1957, as well as the already mentioned constitutional status, size constraints and available weaponry, are limiting factors in assessing its future capabilities.¹³¹ However, its structure, size and composition will obviously be adapted to Japan's 1980's defense policy. Since 1945, defense has been one of the lowest priorities, encompassing less than one per cent of the GNP, and a topic more often avoided than discussed.

Barring the less feasible, drastic circumstances far outside the base case, such as complete withdrawal of all mobile U.S. forces from the Pacific, open warfare on mainland Asia, or the seizure of Taiwan or Korea, Japan in the 1980's will probably prefer to remain economically powerful and militarily weak. This is not to say that there will not be expansion and modernization of existing forces, only that for the present and for the near future, full scale rearmament and possession of nuclear weapons is not a logical or rational option.

The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japanese soil is inevitable, with the exception of the Seventh Fleet.¹³²

¹³¹Buck, op. cit., p. 219-220.

¹³²Even Seventh Fleet ships would most logically operate from Japanese owned and maintained support centers.

The loss of Japan and Okinawa as "staging areas" would not, however, limit the effectiveness of U.S. forces. Mobility could be maintained by falling back to Guam, Tinian and Saipan. However, the protracted withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japanese soil will continue to be a force to lend emphasis and impetus to Japan's need for better home island defense such as ASW, harbor protection and close-in air support. The Constitutional ban against offensive forces and weapons will stand, and, although total troop strength will not increase dramatically, it is anticipated that the Japanese will develop a more modern and better equipped force.

One of Japan's most serious worries is in regard to continued nuclear proliferation. The explosion of a nuclear device by India was of great concern to Japan. Although stolid on their three-point non-nuclear policy, further nuclear proliferation by Third World nations and the associated increased risks of irresponsible use of such weapons, might very well cause Japan to think in terms of defensive nukes if for no other reason than diplomatic "show". Other rationale for Japan to go nuclear include 1) the existence of a full-fledged nuclear capability, including adequate delivery systems by Communist China or 2) deterioration or withdrawal of the American nuclear "umbrella". If that "umbrella" remains assured, for the foreseeable future Japan will eschew nuclear weapons for one main reason -- her concentration of population and industry and her vulnerabilities

as an island nation virtually prohibit any second-strike capability. Therefore, Japan's logical assumption is that she would be far better off and far less a potential target if she had no nuclear capability whatsoever.¹³³ At the same time, polls conducted in the late 1960's of Japanese graduate students, revealed the belief that Japan would acquire nuclear weapons within, at the most, fifteen years. Most of the individuals polled indicated that this would occur after West Germany or India created a precedent.¹³⁴ In a separate Japan-wide poll conducted by the Japan Research Center in 1971, 43 per cent of the respondents believed that Japan would acquire nuclear weapons of her own in the not too distant future, more rapidly if the U.S. withdrew its nuclear protection.¹³⁵ The attitude appears to be greatly affected by the manner in which the question is asked. If asked if Japan will go nuclear, the majority invariably respond in the affirmative. If asked if Japan should go nuclear, the results are most often similar to those presented in Table XIII.

¹³³This policy has extended to forbidding the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan by U.S. forces, even to the point of prohibiting port visits by U.S. nuclear-powered ships. In that respect, it is interesting to note former Ambassador Armin Meyer's observation that, at the same time that the Japanese were building their own nuclear-powered commercial ship, the MUTSU, at a Northern port, public outcries and media pressures forbade the U.S. nuclear-powered commercial vessel SAVANNAH entry to Japanese ports (Meyer, op. cit., p. 89-90).

¹³⁴Kahn, op. cit., p. 13.

¹³⁵Muraoka, op. cit., p. 27.

TABLE XIII

JAPANESE OPINIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS¹³⁶Q. Do you think Japan should have nuclear weapons?

	<u>DEC</u> <u>1970</u>	<u>JUL</u> <u>1971</u>
Japan should have nuclear weapons	7%	5%
Introduction of nukes is acceptable but Japan should not have her own	6	4
Japan should seek security under the nuclear umbrella of her allies without allowing either domestic possession or introduction	9	8
Nuclear weapons are not necessary for the security of the nation	52	55
Other reply	1	1
Don't Know	25	27

It appears that extensive nuclear proliferation, a major internal political shift or serious and disruptive events on the international scene will be the only rationale for Japan's possession of nuclear weapons in the near future.

5. The Case of Taiwan and Korea

In this era of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems, Korea and Taiwan are no longer of intrinsic strategic importance to Japan.¹³⁷ However, Japanese perceptions

¹³⁶Muraoka, op. cit., p. 27. Survey conducted by the Japan Research Center, December 1970 and July 1971.

¹³⁷Reischauer, personal interview, 15 September 1975.

indicate that they are both still areas of primary interest and concern, chiefly because of Japan's fear of Communist domination of either area. Therefore, U.S. policy towards and interest in both nations is extremely important to Japan.

Despite the death of Chiang-Kai-shek and the new American rapport with the PRC, U.S. policy toward Taiwan remains essentially the same. The Chinese want the total removal of U.S. troops from Taiwan; the Soviets prefer to see them remain. China insists upon her claim to Taiwan as an integral part of the mainland; the Soviets prefer to keep the issue of Taiwan ownership open in order to neutralize, or at least curtail, the potential increase of Chinese power and influence in Asia.¹³⁸ It appears that the future of Taiwan is a matter over which Japan still displays a great deal of concern and over which they have very little control. The key, again, is the U.S. commitment, a commitment which is subtly decreasing. The solution to the problem in the view of one observer is to make Taiwan a formal, internationally administered neutral state, withdrawing U.S. troops and placing it under the jurisdiction of the United Nations.¹³⁹

With or without such a move, mainland China is not likely to risk major power, military confrontation over the

¹³⁸Shelton, C.Q., op. cit., p. 5.

¹³⁹Ibid., p. .

island. Since Sino-American rapprochement, the Mao regime has soft-pedaled their vocal claims and demands over the island and, barring unforeseen circumstances, are unlikely to avidly pursue them in the near future.

Korea, however, presents a slightly different situation. Ever fluctuating between relative peace and threatened "hot" war, Korea is the tinderbox which has the potential of igniting a mainland Asia confrontation. Although actual U.S. troop force is not an absolute necessity, the maintenance of the American commitment there is vital. Should the U.S. withdraw their complete protection and hostilities flare on the peninsula, Korea could easily become the stage for a series of major power confrontations and power plays. Japan would watch these occurrences with trepidation and likely lose faith in the U.S. willingness to respond to her security needs. The result could be rearmament, a schism in U.S. - Japan relations, political turmoil and a force strong enough to disrupt the entire balance in Northeast Asia.

6. The U.S. Commitment

As has been mentioned throughout, the U.S. commitment is the vital force behind continued stability in Northeast Asia in general and in Japan in particular. In his delineation of the "New Pacific Doctrine" President Ford pronounced American strength as "basic to any balance of power in Asia" and the partnership with Japan as the "pillar

of our Pacific strategy."¹⁴⁰ His "new" doctrine is admirable but is directly based upon the assumption that Congress and the American people will continue to support military strength in an area where Vietnam remains a stigma. The war in Southeast Asia effectively weakened U.S. influence in the Pacific, both in terms of our willingness to protect our interests there and in terms of our Pacific allies' faith in our willingness to do so. Crisis intervention has become anathema to the American people.¹⁴¹

The result has been a new trepidation on the part of our Pacific allies in fully trusting to the commitment for their security. For example, one of the most staunch anti-Communist regimes in Asia was represented by Filipino President Marcos; yet, very shortly after the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia, Marcos was observed shaking hands at Peking airport with former Premier Chou-En-lai, and making new overtures to "close the gap" between China and the Philippines.

The secret to the viability of the future U.S. commitment to Asia appears to lie in the dangers of over-reaction. The U.S. must accept Vietnam for what it was, a probable error in overall judgment and short-range policy goals, and not allow the Southeast Asia experience to color the

¹⁴⁰Speech by U.S. President Ford in Hawaii, 7 Dec 1975.

¹⁴¹Recent public and media outcries over the extension of military aid to Angola during the recent crisis in Angola attest to this fact.

entire conduct of future foreign and defense policy. The key is to realize where American interests lie and resolve to protect and secure those interests (namely, Japan).

The original hypothesis of this research theorized that the defense and foreign policy role Japan chooses to play in the 1980's would be the key to future American defense policy in Asia. The conclusion has since been reached that it is the converse that is true. The 1980's role of the U.S. in Asia, Japanese (and adversary) perceptions of that role, and the actual and perceived effectiveness of the commitment will be the pivot upon which Japanese policy alternatives will turn.

Revision of the Security Treaty, Japanese option for rearmament and nuclear weapons (considered the most destabilizing alternatives), and the eventuality of overt hostility toward the United States, all depend upon American adherence to the commitment to protect Japanese territorial integrity, economic viability, security of her supply routes and the security of neighboring nations Japan perceives as vital (specifically, Korea and Taiwan).

Physical basing of U.S. troops in the Japanese homeland is no longer a vital determinant and it is expected that the U.S. will continue its protracted withdrawal with the full approval of the Japanese government, with all troops departed by 1980. The Seventh Fleet would remain as a vestige of physical presence (and to lend visibility to

the verbal commitment) and would operate from Japanese maintained support facilities at Yokosuka and Sasebo. The U.S. must and, it is felt, will, reassert and reemphasize the nuclear "umbrella" but will continue to be prohibited to introduce such weapons into the Japanese home islands.

By the early 1980's Americans will most likely take the initiative and make overtures to have the Mutual Security Treaty revised to reflect their updated status of full partner in Japan's defense rather than the paternalistic leader of Japan's policy as implied in the past. American leaders will continue to urge the up-dating and modernization of the Self Defense Forces but emphasize the need to keep increased domestic defense capabilities relatively low key in order to avoid the fears or suspicions of a resurgent Japanese militarism.

Barring sudden or extreme shifts in U.S. leadership, total withdrawal from the Pacific theater or total abrogation of the commitment should not be a danger. Vietnam will be put behind us and the U.S. - Japanese tensions of the 1970's, rather than marking the end of the U.S. - Japan alliance should prove to mark the beginning of a new understanding of the meaning of "partnership" in the Pacific.

VI. CONCLUSION

When a celestial object such as a rising sun is near the horizon, it appears to be a great deal larger than when it is at its zenith. But the observer should be cautioned that this is an illusion. It would be a great mistake in the case of Japan to assume that the rising sun has reached its zenith. Rather the opposite; it has just begun its climb. How brightly, where and when and how long it is going to shine are all open issues ...

Herman Kahn
The Emerging Japanese
Superstate

Japan's traditional post-war policies are becoming increasingly more autonomous from those of the United States, despite the fact that her defense policy has remained firmly linked to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Her future, as the above quote implies, is an open issue and the alternatives available to her are diverse. Each option will have a wide range of causes and an even wider range of effects, but it will be the continued stability and validity of the American commitment in East Asia that will be the ultimate determinant of the alternative selected.

Three major aspects of Japan's domestic and foreign policy play the role of key elements in any future decision.

1) The Japanese economy has virtually dictated the overall conduct of Japan's post-war policies. The absolute need to guarantee her economic viability, the security of the sea lanes and sources of energy and resource supply,

will continue to be a major policy determinant in the future.

2) Japan's defense posture, despite internal and external pressures to the contrary, has generally been predicated upon a concept of minimum defense. Her 1980's security policies will hinge directly upon the effectiveness of the U.S. commitment as both a strategic deterrent force and as a means for ensuring Japan's economic stability. Actual or perceived threats to that stability, without the guarantees tacitly inherent in the U.S. commitment, could easily cause a drastic shift in the minimum defense concept.

3) Japan's perceptions of the "balance of power" in Asia will also have a profound effect on her policy options. A major factor in Japan's political "independence" from the United States, is her new relations with the nations of Asia perceptibly important to Japan in preserving her status and maintaining stability in the Far East. Specifically included must be an analysis of Japan's rapprochement with the USSR and with mainland China as well as the role and status of the two countries she considers to be primary threats to her security — Korea and Taiwan.

Japan's future policy alternatives encompass a wide range of options, each one dependent upon a given set of circumstances or events which could conceivably make any one policy choice inevitable. Nearly all of these pivotal circumstances and events revolve, directly or indirectly, around the maintenance of a credible commitment by the U.S. to Japan and her allies in East Asia.

It should well be noted that should the commitment fail, either overtly or in the eyes of our allies or our adversaries, the consequences could prove to be severe. The disruption of the current level of stability in East Asia could lead to one-power hegemony, Japanese rearmament, and/or further nuclear proliferation. In addition, there remains the possibility of arriving at a new adversary-oriented, strategic maritime balance in the Western Pacific. Such a situation would leave a poorly prepared, ill-equipped Japan in the center.

Japan is the only East Asian nation intrinsically important to the United States. In analyzing current and projected Japanese policy, the author has emphasized both her vital need for a security she is ill-equipped to provide and her new desires for autonomy from U.S. political domination. The United States must assist Japan in attaining her desired goals in an effort to maintain an economically stable, non-hostile Japan. However, the analysis of the research completed in the writing of this thesis also leads the author to firmly believe that this base case will be the future case only if the United States continues to openly acknowledge Japan's importance to the Western world and maintains firm guarantees for the preservation of her economic and physical security.

APPENDIX A
JAPAN'S POLITICAL PARTIES¹⁴²

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)

Membership - approximately 2 million registered

The Liberal Democratic Party has maintained control of the Government of Japan since 1955, the year in which three separate parties, the Liberal, the Progressive and the Cooperative were merged. It is essentially a conservative party represented and supported by big business interests and the majority of rural voters. Its leadership is generally drawn from the business and civil service communities and is considered to have the "highest educated" membership.

Party emphasis has concentrated on the fullest development of the economy and of private enterprise through direct assistance and government regulation. It has stressed the development and modernization of heavy industry and, in the past, has generally relegated social welfare problems to a lesser priority. The LDP is unitedly pro-American, supports the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty, but appears widely divided on other issues of foreign policy.

¹⁴²Sources for information on political parties were: Area Handbook on Japan, p. 320-337, Morley, *op. cit.*, p. 76-78 and United States - Japanese Political Relations, Special Report # 7, p. 51-67, Georgetown University for Strategic Studies, May 1968.

THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY (JSP)

Membership - approximately 500,000 registered

The JSP constitutes the largest opposition party, but has only once been able to hold power (for nine months in the period 1947-1948 in the form of a coalition government). Despite a right wing breakaway in 1960, the JSP remains severely ideologically factioned. Three major internal groups can be identified: the leftists, who continue to emphasize "class warfare" as a goal, the rightists, a more moderate group emphasizing less doctrinaire problems, and the centrists, a combination of the left and the right. The party leadership tends to fall under the leftist faction. The majority of party support is obtained from labor organizations, chiefly from SOHYO, the largest Japanese labor federation.

Regarding defense policy, the JSP generally opposes foreign basing, is anti-Self Defense Force, wants the abrogation of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty and supports a policy of unarmed neutrality.

Although not united on foreign policy issues, the party has proclaimed support for the conclusion of peace and non-aggression treaties with the USSR and the PRC. The Japan Socialist Party also touts the necessity for the re-unification of the Korean Peninsula.

THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY (JCP)

Membership - actual membership is unknown but has been estimated at 300,000

In existence since 1922, the JCP was not legally constituted until 1945. Historically moderate and unaligned, the party received some popular support until it became engaged in violent, Stalinist activities in the 1950's. Today, the members are considered to be rigid, hard-line Marxian ideologists, although still effectively dissociated from either Moscow or Peking. Its support among the farmers and the educated is virtually non-existent and labor support is small.

As regards national security, the JCP calls for the disbanding of the SDF and full support of Article IX of the 1946 Constitution. It demands the abrogation of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty, the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Asia and espouses the advantages of unarmed neutrality.

THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY (DSP)

Membership - approximately 35,000 registered

The DSP is an offshoot of the JSP when the party split in 1960 and represents a moderate form of socialism. It generally represents a middle ground between the LDP and the JSP. Supported chiefly by DOMEI, the labor federation of the automobile and shipping industries, the party represents a nationally based rather than a worker based policy.

As regards national defense, the DSP favors the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty with modifications to reflect a

more balanced form of collective security. Although not anti-American, the party wants the removal of U.S. troops from the Japanese home islands.

It advised caution regarding future relations with the People's Republic of China and promotes a policy of peaceful coexistence with all nations.

THE KOMEITO (CLEAN GOVERNMENT PARTY)

Membership - unknown, but the party claims 15-20 million

The Komeito is the political arm of the Soka Gakkai, a religious lay society which is an offshoot of Nichiren Buddhism. Although its first involvement in partisan politics came in 1955, it did not become a full-fledged political party until 1964. Only remotely resembling Buddhism, the religious base of the party promises to offer a truly Japanese alternative to the values and moralities of foreign ideologies, and is based upon the desire to reconstruct Japan under the concept of Buddhist democracy. Despite its vague platform, the Komeito is the most cohesive, the best organized and the most dogmatic of the political parties. Its leadership is drawn directly from the leadership of the religious movement and, therefore, factionalism is virtually non-existent. Its voting support is small because of a popular fear of the organization's religious intolerance and its authoritarian tendencies.

In the realm of foreign and defense policy, the Komeito calls for neutralism, an immediate termination of the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty, nuclear disarmament and a universal system of collective security.

APPENDIX B

TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN AND JAPAN

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all people and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving nations to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative

Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty Between the United States of American and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of American and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinions of the Governments of the United States of American and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

In WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington in the English and the Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960:

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Christian A. Herter
Douglas MacArthur II

FOR JAPAN:

Nobosuke Kishi
Aiichiro Fujiyama

APPENDIX C

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Entered into force March 5, 1970

The States concluding this treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapons States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons test in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek

to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of their manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery paramount to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any States, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferer whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguard system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the

fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source of special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180 day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The texts of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested

to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purpose of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years, thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of

ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events if it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

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
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